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Abstract
In this thesis we study two major topics in cryptanalysis and optimization: software
algebraic cryptanalysis and elliptic curve optimizations in cryptanalysis. The idea
of algebraic cryptanalysis is to model a cipher by a Multivariate Quadratic (MQ)
equation system. Solving MQ is an NP-hard problem. However, NP-hard prob-
lems have a point of phase transition where the problems become easy to solve.
This thesis explores different optimizations to make solving algebraic cryptanalysis
problems easier.
We first worked on guessing a well-chosen number of key bits, a specific opti-
mization problem leading to guess-then-solve attacks on GOST cipher. In addition
to attacks, we propose two new security metrics of contradiction immunity and SAT
immunity applicable to any cipher. These optimizations play a pivotal role in recent
highly competitive results on full GOST. This and another cipher Simon, which we
cryptanalyzed were submitted to ISO to become a global encryption standard which
is the reason why we study the security of these ciphers in a lot of detail.
Another optimization direction is to use well-selected data in conjunction with
Plaintext/Ciphertext pairs following a truncated differential property. These allow
to supplement an algebraic attack with extra equations and reduce solving time.
This was a key innovation in our algebraic cryptanalysis work on NSA block cipher
Simon and we could break up to 10 rounds of Simon64/128. The second major
direction in our work is to inspect, analyse and predict the behaviour of ElimLin
attack the complexity of which is very poorly understood, at a level of detail never
seen before. Our aim is to extrapolate and discover the limits of such attacks, and
go beyond with several types of concrete improvement.
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Finally, we have studied some optimization problems in elliptic curves which
also deal with polynomial arithmetic over finite fields. We have studied existing
implementations of the secp256k1 elliptic curve which is used in many popular
cryptocurrency systems such as Bitcoin and we introduce an optimized attack on
Bitcoin brain wallets and improved the state of art attack by 2.5 times.
Keywords: algebraic cryptanalysis, SAT solver, ElimLin, symmetric encryp-
tion, GOST, Simon, Bitcoin brain wallets, Elliptic curves
Impact Statement
This thesis aims to make both acdemic and non acdemic research impacts. We aim
to make contribution to the reasearch area in algebraic cryptanalysis. We proposed
a few methods to improve algebraic attack, such as using well selected plaintext
ciphertext pairs, guessing a selected set of key bits. We studied fisrt time in detail
how ElimLin algorithm works and developed tools for analysising newly generated
linear equations.
Our proposed methods are preformed on well known or widely used ciphers:
Russian GOST cipher and new NSA block cipher SIMON. Both of them has been
submitted to ISO in order to become an international standard. As an impact of
our research, together with other people’s research work, ISO rejected both of the
ciphers.
We also studied the security of Bitcoin brain wallets, and published a brain-
wallet attack which improved the state of art by a factor of 2.5. Our work has
been reported by a number of tech websites, also widely read within Bitcoin com-
munity. We made Bitcoin brain wallets users relise it’s not a secure way to store
their money. As a result, Brainwallet.org, the website which are used by Bitcoin
comunity to generate brain wallets has permenantly closed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques that ensure the confidential-
ity and integrity of information. Cryptography is one of the oldest fields of techni-
cal study which we can find records of. Going back to 1900 BC, cryptography is
found in non-standard hieroglyphs carved into monuments from the Old Kingdom
of Egypt [108]. Modern cryptography started out as classified military technology,
but now has become very common in our daily lives. Cryptography is not only
used in banking cards, secure websites and electronic signatures, but also in public
transport cards, car keys, and building passes.
Block cipher is one of the main tools in cryptography; It uses a secret key to
transform a plaintext into a ciphertext in such a way that this secret key is needed
to recover the original plaintext. During the last 30 years, the academic research
on the security of block ciphers has evolved from an empirical way to solve the
problem of designing a secure algorithm towards a list of well-understood and well-
established security properties that a block cipher must fulfil in order to be secure.
Unfortunately, the security of a block cipher is still heavily dependent on the talent,
the intuition, and the time at disposal of the people attempting to break it!
Currently, because of the continuously growing impact of mobile phones,
smart cards, RFID tags, sensor networks, and the rapid development in the In-
ternet of Things (IoT), there is a huge demand to provide security and to design
suitable cryptographic algorithms that can be efficiently implemented in resource-
constrained devices. The area of cryptography that studies the design and the secu-
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rity of such lightweight cryptographic primitives, called lightweight cryptography,
is rapidly evolving and becoming increasingly important.
Most of the cryptographic primitives have been carefully designed, especially
those that have been standardized. However, not all of them have been well studied
by researchers. Special properties inside widely used cryptography schemes, which
might lead to faster attacks, are discovered every year. Also, in real life cryptogra-
phy applications, bad design, implementation or choice of parameters could lead to
huge security issues.
The main aim of my PhD research is to investigate the use of and to develop
various optimization tools and software, such as SAT solver and evolutionary al-
gorithms, in the field of automated cryptanalysis; apply cryptanalysis techniques to
modern block ciphers, (such as GOST [97], Simon [14] and even elliptic curve cryp-
tography problems) with optimization tools or software; and check if such tools can
improve the current best attacks and discover new attacks. We hope to contribute to
future government standards and popular cryptography applications. In this thesis,
our cryptanalysis targets are the Russian government standard cipher GOST, the
NSA newly proposed cipher Simon, and Bitcoin Elliptic Curve.
The first part of this thesis gives the general introduction of cryptography, cypt-
analysis and elliptic curve. We will review existing cryptanalysis methods, also
provide a review of related work on GOST, SIMON and Bitcoin brain wallets.
The second part focuses on software algebraic crytanalysis. Automated black
box techniques, such as SAT solvers or Gro¨bner basis computations, have become
increasingly sophisticated and powerful. In the domain of algebraic cryptanalysis,
they are used to solve equation systems that are converted from the cipher. Solving
such equation systems is an NP-hard problem. When the problem becomes larger
(e.g., trying to solve a larger number of rounds), it becomes impossible to solve
using a normal PC. This is the fundamental problem of software algebraic crypt-
analysis. However, NP-hard problems normally have a “phase transition” point
when the problem is suddenly changed from “hard to solve” to “easy to solve”.
This phase transition also appears in software algebraic cryptanalysis, for example,
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using chosen plaintext in a counter mode then solving by ElimLin [58]. In this
thesis, we explore different ways to improve software algebraic cryptanalysis. We
introduce two possible directions: guessing a set of well chosen key bits and using
well-chosen samples. We study GOST and Simon for a concrete number of rounds,
discover properties inside the cipher structure which will lead to more efficient at-
tacks. We will then demonstrate how to make these attacks work better by:
• Inspection: Learn what is trivial and non-trivial behavior of ElimLin algo-
rithm by inspecting the equations found by ElimLin.
• Guess-then-solve: With some “cost of guessing”, we can reduce the solving
complexity. Selecting the right set of bits to guess makes the problem easier
to solve.
• Selection of samples: Use specific plaintexts suggested by independent well-
known attacks, such as [generalized] linear attacks, truncated differential
properties and cube attacks.
The third part of this thesis is about understanding how elliptic curve cryp-
tography can be efficiently coded for fast implementation and also cryptanalysis.
We will discuss implemented a dedicated speed optimization for Bitcoin brain wal-
let attack. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that was invented in 2008 and has become
extremely popular since 2012. Bitcoin users can deterministically derive the pri-
vate key used for transmitting money from a password. Such wallets are known as
brain wallets. Brain wallets are appealing because they free users from storing their
private keys. Unfortunately, brain wallets were not designed carefully enough and
allowed attackers to conduct unlimited offline password guessing. In 2015, a white
hat hacker published the implementation of the brain wallet attack. The results of
this attack were later published in 2016 [164]. We believe that such an attack can
be made faster to make brain wallets much more vulnerable. In order to optimize
the attack, we study Elliptic Curve secp256k1, which is used in Bitcoin. We focus
on the speed of the key generation process and provide the first detailed bench-
marks for all the major implementations of this curve. The key generation process
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is a fundamental part in the Bitcoin brain wallet attack, which is also the most part
cost most time to compute. As a result, we are able to examine passwords in brain
wallets 2.5 times faster than the state of the art.
Chapter 2
Introduction to Cryptography
Cryptology is the science of hiding and recovering secret information. It is mainly
divided into two research areas: the areas of cryptography and cryptanalysis. Tra-
ditionally, cryptography is the study and practice of techniques that are used to
establish secure communication between two parties in the presence of unautho-
rized third parties, usually called adversaries or attackers. Cryptography aims to
prevent the adversary from learning anything about the original content of the com-
munication, even if the adversary has some type of access to the communication
channel.
In general, if two parties would like to share some confidential information,
they will share some secret information in advance. The piece of secret information
will be used to transfer the original ordinary message (plaintext P) into an unintel-
ligible message (ciphertext C) by the sender S. Additionally, C can be transferred
back to P by the receiver R using the same piece of secret information. Formally,
this secret information is called the key which is usually a short string of bits that
needed to decrypt the ciphertext, while the transformations are called the encryption
and decryption algorithms.
Cryptanalysis is the sophisticated analysis and study of the security that a given
cryptographic scheme offers. It focuses on the techniques related to recovering ei-
ther the original content of an encrypted message without the knowledge of the
secret key or some fraction of information from the message. This analysis is per-
formed under different scenarios related to the adversary’s resources, type of access,
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and the adversary’s objectives. In general, the main purpose of cryptanalysis is to
find the hidden weaknesses of a cryptosystem and develop a method of decryption.
In this chapter, we will give a brief introduction to two types of encryption
systems: symmetric encryption systems and asymmetric encryption systems. We
will discuss in detail block ciphers in symmetric cryptography, which are widely
used and primarily implemented in the real world.
2.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryptions
Cryptographic algorithms are classified based on how key material is used and man-
aged. Normally, they are classified into three groups. There are keyless algorithms,
which do not use any key and do not need to trust anyone. Another type of algo-
rithm uses a shared key, which needs to trust everyone that has the key. The third
type is private-public key algorithm, in which the private key is only known by one
person [38].
Generally, a cryptosystem has a sender S and a receiver R who want to send
messages over an insecure channel. S and R are assumed to share a small amount of
information beforehand, which is called the key. A cryptosystem is an encryption
scheme that aims to protect the communication between S and R over an insecure
channel.
A cryptosystem often contains an encryption function E, which takes a plain-
text p and a secret key K which is composed of random bits and outputs a ciphertext
c= EK(p), and the decryption function D (inverse of E), which takes the ciphertext
c and the secret key K
′
as input and recovers the initial plaintext, i.e. DK′ (c) = p.
The cryptosystem should be designed in such a way that even when adversaries
obtain ciphertext, they cannot gain any information regarding the secret key or the
plaintext.
In a cryptosystem, if K = K
′
which means the same secret key is used for both
encryption and decryption, then the cryptosystem is called symmetric cryptosystem.
Definition 1 (Symmetric Cryptosystem). Let P be the finite set of plaintexts, C be
the finite set of ciphertexts, and K be the finite key space. An efficiently computable
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encryption function E takes one plaintext in P and a key k ∈ K returns a ciphertext
in C. We write:
Ek : P→C
for the operation of executing E on k and P, and a corresponding efficiently com-
putable decryption function is given byDk:
Dk : C→ P
such that Dk(Ek(p)) = p for all plaintext p ∈ P.
If the keys used for encryption and decryption are different to each other, but
related in a way such that decryption of a given ciphertext c results in plaintext p,
then the cryptosystem is called asymmetric cryptosystem.
Definition 2 (Asymmetric Cryptosystem). Let P be the finite set of plaintexts, C
be the finite set of ciphertexts and K be the key space. An efficiently computable
key generation algorithm keyGen() randomly generates a pair of public key pk and
secret key sk; an efficiently computable encryption function E takes one pk ∈ K and
a plaintext in P returns a cipher in C. We write:
Epk : P→C
and an sk ∈ K for the operation of executing E on pk and P, and the corresponding
efficiently computable decryption function is given by Dsk ∈ D:
Dsk : C→ P
such that Dsk(Epk(p)) = p for all plaintexts p ∈ P.
Note that symmetric cryptosystems have two algorithms: encryption and de-
cryption. Asymmetric cryptosystems normally have at least three algorithms: key
generation, encryption, and decryption. In a symmetric cryptosystem, if the key is
compromised, then an adversary can decrypt any message passed from sender to
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receiver and gains full control over the system. Asymmetric cryptosystems solve
this problem by using different, but corresponding keys, for encryption and decryp-
tion. However, modern cryptography sometimes requires a huge number of keys
that must be distributed securely.
Researchers start to solve the problem by combining both types of cryptosys-
tem, called a hybrid encryption scheme. This cryptosystem combines the conve-
nience of asymmetric with the efficiency of a symmetric cryptosystem [153]. In
hybrid encryption, symmetric cryptosystem is used for encryption, while the secret
key is shared using a protocol based on public-key cryptography, cf. Figure 2.1.
There are two main components of a hybrid encryption scheme, Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (KEM) and Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM). The key feature is
that the two parts are independent of one another. The framework was first formal-
ized by Cramer and Shoup in 2003 and we refer the reader to their work [76] for
more details.
Figure 2.1: Hybrid encryption
2.2 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a type of symmetric encryption system. In block ciphers, the plain-
text is divided into blocks of a fixed length, which are then encrypted into blocks of
ciphertexts using the same key. Block ciphers are deterministic algorithms, which
means that the same inputs result in the same outputs [79]. Block ciphers are con-
sidered as highly secure cryptography. Normally block ciphers are designed to be
used for 50 years, while asymmetric cryptosystems are usually obsolete after 10
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years (for example, NSA no longer recommends NIST P-256 elliptic curve in 2016
[129]).
The efficiently computable encryption algorithm EK(P) and decryption algo-
rithm Dk(C) in a block cipher both use blocks of n-bit as input and k-bit as a key K.
Dk(C) is the inverse of the encryption map EK(P). More formally, we have that:
C = EK(P) : {0,1}k×{0,1}n→{0,1}n
Dk(C) = E−1K (P) : {0,1}k×{0,1}n→{0,1}n
such that D(Ek(P)) = P ∀K ∈ {0,1}k.
In general, for every key, a block cipher is a permutation of the form {0,1}n→
{0,1}n for n-bit block. So in total there are (2n!)' (2n−1)2n possible permutations.
A block cipher which operates on n-bit blocks and uses k-bit keys is equivalent to
a collection of 2k distinct permutations on n-bit. A good design of a block cipher
aims to choose the 2k permutations uniformly at random1 from the set of all (2n!)
permutations.
Historical ciphers can be divided into three groups: substitution ciphers, trans-
position ciphers and product ciphers.
2.2.1 Substitution Ciphers
As indicated in the name, in substitution ciphers, every character in plaintext is sub-
stituted by some ciphertext character. There are four types of substitution ciphers:
simple substitution, polyalphabetic substitution, homophonic substitution and poly-
gram substitution [116]. In this thesis, we only discuss simple and polyalphabetic
substitutions:
Simple Substitution
In a simple substitution cipher, each plaint text character is transformed into
a ciphertext character via the same encryption function E. More formally, let
P = p0, ..., pn−1 be an n-character plaintext and C = c0, ...cn−1 be a ciphertext,
1Or it is impossible to see if it was otherwise.
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∀i : 0≤ i < n
E : P→C
ci = E(pi)
Around 50 BC, Julius Caesar wrote to Marcus Cicero using a cipher that encrypted
messages by shifting every letter in the plaintext three positions to the right in the
alphabet. This cipher is based on shifted alphabets. For the Caesar cipher, the
secret key k is +3 mod 26. In general, the cipher is easily broken by shifting the
ciphertexts one position until the plaintext arises.
Polyalphabetic Substitution
In a polyalphabetic substitution, the characters in plaintext are transformed into
ciphertext using a j-character key K = k0,k1, ...k j−1, which defines j distinct en-
cryption functions Ek0,Ek1, ...,Ek j−1 . In this case, ∀i : 0≤ i < n
Ekl : P→C ∀l : 0≤ l < j
ci = Eki mod j(pi)
The Vigene`re cipher [140], first published in 1586, uses polyalphabetic substitution
and is defined as follows:
ci = Eki mod j(pi) = pi+ ki mod j
2.2.2 Transposition Systems
Transposition systems are essentially permutations of the characters in plaintext.
Therefore, a transposition cipher is defined as follows ∀i : 0≤ i < n
η : {0, ...,(n−1)}→ {0, ...,(n−1)}, a permutation
ci = E(pi) = pη(i)
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Many transposition ciphers operate by blocks which permute characters with a fixed
period j. In that case:
η : {0, ...,( j−1)}→ {0, ...,( j−1)}, a permutation
ci = E(pi) = p(i div j)+η(i mod j)
The Vigene`re and in general substitution ciphers can be broken when enough ci-
phertext is available to the cryptanalyst using the index of coincidence, Kasiski’s
method, etc. [78, 140, 108]. Transposition ciphers can be broken using the fre-
quency distributions for bigrams, trigrams, and N-grams [78, 140, 108]. This
knowledge about natural language is also very useful for our later work in pass-
word cracking.
2.2.3 Product Ciphers
To produce much stronger ciphers than the ones we have currently seen, we can
combine substitution and transposition ciphers. These ciphers are called product
ciphers. Most block ciphers that are still used today are product ciphers. An iterated
cipher is one kind of product ciphers in which the ciphertexts are computed by
iteratively applying a round function several times to the plaintext. In each round, a
round key is combined with the text input.
Definition 3. In an r-round iterated block cipher, the ciphertext is computed by
iteratively applying a round function g to the plaintext, such that
Ci = g(Ci−1,Ki), i = 1, ...,r
where C0 is the plaintext, Ki is a round key, and Cr is the ciphertext. Decryption
is done by reversing the above function. Therefore, for a fixed key Ki, g must be
invertible when Ki is fixed.
Feistel Ciphers
In general, it is not easy to make an invertible function that makes the encryption
and decryption process identical. One method was created by the German physicist
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and cryptographer Horst Feistel, who was a pioneer in this area while working for
American IBM. Feistel, together with Don Coppersmith, introduced the concept of
Feistel networks while working on IBM’s “Lucifer” cipher in 1973 [91]. Their work
gained the respect of the United States Federal Government who adapted it to the
Data Encryption Standard (DES), which is based on the Lucifer project with some
changes done by the NSA [135].
Figure 2.2: Feistel network
Definition 4 (Feistel Network, cf. Figure 2.2). A Feistel cipher is an iterated cipher
that maps a 2t-bit plaintext block (L0,R0) where L0 and R0 are the left and right
t-bit halves respectively, to a 2t-bit block (Lr,Rr) after r-rounds of encryption.
The result of i-rounds encryption ∀i : 1≤ i < r−1 is computed as follows:
Li = Ri−1
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Ri = Li−1⊕ f (Ri−1,Ki−1)
where Ki is the ith subkey derived from the secret key K and f the one-round func-
tion which takes a subkey and a t-block as input to map into another t-bit block.
We will assume that ⊕ is the bitwise exclusive-or operation, if not explicitly stated
otherwise. This process is iteratively applied for r− 2 rounds. In the last round,
there is no swap between two halves Li−1 and Ri−1. This makes the decryption of
the Feistel network the same as the encryption process, only requires a reversal of
the key schedule. The final output is given by the following:
Lr = Lr−1⊕ f (Rr−1,Kr−1)
Rr = Rr−1
Since the encryption and decryption processes are identical (except for the
key order), the software and hardware implementation of Feistel ciphers are much
easier.
2.2.4 Courtois Toy Cipher
Courtois Toy Cipher (CTC) is a block cipher designed by Courtois, as a research
tool cipher for performing experiments with algebraic attacks (see Section 3.5) us-
ing a PC with a reasonable quantity of RAM [42]. CTC has a substitution layer
followed by a diffusion layer in each round. This structure follows the concepts
of confusion and diffusion originally described by Claude Shannon [151]. A very
good description of confusion and diffusion properties is provided by Massey [109]:
Confusion: The ciphertext should depend on the plaintext statistics in a manner
too complicated to be exploited by the cryptanalyst
Diffusion: Each digit of the plaintext and each digit of the secret key should
influence many digits of the ciphetext.
In CTC substitution layer is done by a common component in block cipher
called substitution tables (S-boxes). Generally an S-box takes some number of
input bits m, transforms them into some number of output bits n, where n is not
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necessarily equal to m. The S-boxes used in the CTC are random permutations on
three bits with no special structure (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: CTC 3-bits to 3-bit S-Box. It can be described by 14 quadratic equations in 22
monomials [42]
Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Output 7 6 0 4 2 5 1 3
Figure 2.3: CTC Cipher - A toy cipher with B=2 S-boxes per round.
The structure of the cipher for Nr rounds and with B = 2 S-boxes is shown in
Figure 2.3. The bits of the block size are ordered as 0, ...,Bs−1, where s = 3 is the
S-box size. The bits in position 0,1,2 enter the first S-box, 3,4,5 enter the second
S-box and so on. Each round consists of the XOR with the derived key Ki−1 and a
linear diffusion layer D. The key size equals the block size. We donote by Xi( j) for
i= 1, ...,Nr, j = 1, ...,Bs−1 as the input bits to the i-th round after XORing with the
dervied key. Yi( j) as the output bits of S-box and Zi( j) as the corresponding output
of diffusion layer D. The i-th round derived key Ki is obtained from the secret key
K0 by a simple permutation as follows:
Ki( j) = K0(i+ j mod Bs) (2.1)
The diffusion part D of the cipher is as follows:
Zi( j·1987+257 mod Bs) = Yi( j),∀i = 1, ...,Nr, j = 0 (2.2)
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Zi( j·1987+257 mod Bs) = Yi( j)⊕Yi( j+137 mod Bs),∀i = 1, ...,Nr, j 6= 0 (2.3)
The idea behind the design of CTC is to demonstrate that it is possible to
break a cipher with sufficiently good diffusion using a small number of plaintexts.
Intuitively, if the input parameters (e.g. number of S-boxes in each round B and
number of rounds Nr, ) are large enough, then the cipher is expected to be more
secure.
In 2007 Courtois suggested a tweaked version of CTC, named CTC2, which
is expected to be more secure and flexible [40]. The main difference is that the key
schedule of CTC2 has been extended to use keys of any size, independently of the
block size. In CTC2, the key size of key K, denoted by Hk, is not necessarily equal
to the block size Bs and it is computed in the following way:
Ki( j) = K( j+i·509 mod Hk) (2.4)
The diffusion part D of the cipher CTC2 is defined as follows:
Zi( j·1987+257 mod Bs) = Yi( j)⊕Yi( j+137 mod Bs)⊕Yi( j+274 mod Bs), if j = 257 mod Bs
(2.5)
Zi( j·1987+257 mod Bs) = Yi( j)⊕Yi( j+137 mod Bs),otherwise (2.6)
2.2.5 DES
DES is a block-cipher based on the Feistel Network iterative structure. It was
adopted in 1977 by the US Standards body National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) for federal agencies to use in protecting sensitive, unclassified
information. It maps 64 bits to 64 bits using keys of 56 bits and consists of 16
rounds. It uses two 64-bit permutations IP(·) and FP(·) before and after the round
functions, respectively. These permutations satisfy FP = IP−1. These permutations
have no cryptographic effect and they are used for facilitating loading blocks in and
out of mid-1970s 8-bit based hardware [141].
The operations involved in the DES round function are shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: DES Round Fuction
The key schedule of DES derives 16 48-bit sub-keys from the initial 56-bit key and
each sub-key is introduced in a different round via XOR operation. The Expansion
function E takes as input a 32-bit half block and ex- pands it into a 48-bit block by
repeating certain bits. The output of XOR operation is split into 8 consecutive 6-bit
sub-vectors x1,x2, ...,x8. Then each xi is given as input to a 6-bit to 4-bit S-box. A
permutation function P is applied to the 32-bit output such that each set of S-box’s
output bits are spread across 4 different S-boxes in the next round.
Nowadays, due to the 56 bits key size being too small, brute force attack is
possible to break DES. In 2005, NIST withdrew DES from being the encryption
standard.
Chapter 3
Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
The history of cryptanalysis is as long and as fascinating as the history of cryp-
tography. For example, in 1917, an article in “Scientific American” claimed that
the Vigene`re cipher was “impossible of translation” [116]. Today, most cryptog-
raphy classes at university use the Vigene`re cipher as an exercise to illustrate that
this claim is not true. When discussing the security of a cryptosystem, one needs
to define a model that works in the real world for which we will use the model of
Shannon [151].
The sender and the receiver share a common key K over a secure channel in
advance. The sender encrypts a plaintext P using the secret key K, sends ciphertext
C over an insecure channel to the receiver. The receiver then decrypts C to P using
K. The attacker has access to the insecure channel and can intercept the ciphertext.
In this chapter we assume that the sender and receiver use a secret key cipher EK(·)
of n-bits block size and k-bits size of key K.
The definition of security is also strongly related to what type of attackers you
are defending against. In chapter 5 of Bruce Schneier’s book [143], the author
categorizes attackers along the following basic lines:
1. Adversarial goals and motivations.
2. Resources: money, human resources, computing power, memory, risk, exper-
tise, etc.
3. Access to the system.
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A system could be secure against one type of attackers but not secure to another
type. This reflects on the different types of security assumptions and classification
of attacks which we will discuss later.
To evaluate the security of a cipher we assume:
Assumption 1. All keys are equally likely and a key K is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom.
Also we will assume that the attacker knows all the details about the cryp-
tographic algorithm used by the sender and receiver, except the secret key. This
assumption is known as Kerckhoffs’s assumption [108].
Assumption 2.A. The enemy cryptanalyst knows all details of the enciphering pro-
cess and deciphering process except for the value of the secret key.
This is not quite realistic if we look at the history of cryptography and crypt-
analysis. As an extension of Assumption 2.A, we discuss the following two as-
sumptions.
Assumption 2.B. The enemy cryptanalyst knows all the details of the enciphering
process and deciphering process except the value of the key and the Substitution-
box (S-box) which is a core component of symmetric key algorithms that performs
substitution.
Under this assumption, the S-boxes are like the master key or a high-level
key, which is kept secret at a certain parameter (e.g., banks or country) and can be
computed by the enemy, but at a high cost. This is similar to the rotors used in
the German Enigma machine during World War II. The attacker has to recover the
S-boxes first through silicon reverse engineering or try for different sets of known
S-boxes, then perform normal cryptanalysis as in Assumption 2.A.
Assumption 2.C. The enemy cryptanalyst knows all the details of the enciphering
and deciphering processes except that the cipher has been tweaked; for example
90% of the cipher is what we know.
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For example, the encryption algorithm used in Chinese Sim cards is known as
COMP128-V0, which is defined by China Mobile and only used in China. In this
case, the attacker has again two steps under this assumption: first to recover the
cipher through reverse engineering and try different sets of known S-boxes; then
performs normal cryptanalysis as Assumption 2.A.
3.1 Classification of Attacks
Regarding access to the system, Schneier classifies the possible attacks an attacker
can perform as follows: [141]
1. Ciphertext-only Attack: The attacker processes a set of intercepted cipher-
texts.
2. Known Plaintext Attack: The attacker obtains a set of s plaintexts
P1,P2, ...,Ps, and the corresponding ciphertexts C1,C2, ...,Cs.
3. Chosen Plaintext Attack: The attacker chooses a prior set of s plain-
texts P1,P2, ...,Ps and obtains, in some way, the corresponding ciphertexts
C1,C2, ...,Cs.
4. Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Attack: The attacker chooses a set of s
plaintext P1,P2, ...,Ps interactively as he obtains the corresponding ciphertext
C1,C2, ...,Cs. That is, the attacker chooses P1, obtains C1, and then chooses
P2 etc.
5. Chosen Ciphertext Attacks: For symmetric ciphers, Chosen Ciphertext At-
tacks are similar to the Chosen Plaintext Attack and the Adaptively Chosen
Plaintext Attack.
6. Chosen Plaintext and Ciphertext Attack: The attacker has access to both
encryption and decryption oracles and can choose both plaintext and cipher-
text.
The chosen text attacks are the most powerful attacks. However, they are also
unrealistic in many applications. If redundancy exists in plaintext space, it will
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be very hard for an attacker to find an encrypted non-meaningful plaintext sent by
the sender, and to get the ciphertexts decrypted. However, if a system is secure
against an Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Attack, then it is also secure against all
other attacks.
Modern cryptanalysis of block ciphers has focused on finding the secret key K
for any scenario, even unrealistic ones. Importantly, there are other serious attacks
for public key cryptography, which do not find the secret key. Knudsen classifies
the types of attacks as follows [115]:
1. Total break: An attacker finds the secret key K.
2. Global deduction: An attacker finds an algorithm A, which is functionally
equivalent to EK(·)(or DK(·)) without knowing the key K.
3. Instance (local) deduction: An attacker finds the plaintext (ciphertext) of an
intercepted ciphertext (plaintext), which was not obtained from the legitimate
sender.
4. Information deduction: An attacker gains some information about the key,
plaintexts or ciphertexts, which was not obtained directly from the sender or
before the attack.
This classification is hierarchical, i.e., if a total break is possible, then a global
deduction is possible, etc.
Data Requirements
Attacks can also be characterized by the resources they require. These resources
include time complexity, memory usage, and data requirements. Although the first
two types of resources are very obvious, it is worth pointing out the data require-
ment is also a key component that makes an attack able to work in practice. Full
plaintext and ciphertext pairs are not easy to obtain in the real world. Some of the
attacks work only if all possible plaintext and ciphertext pairs for a single key are
known which is called single key scenario [21], and some of the attacks (which have
only appeared in recent years) are specifically designed to take advantage of a so-
called multiple key scenario, where the attacker has access to data encrypted with
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more than one key (such attacks typically also work in standard single key scenario,
however in this case they will be less advantageous) [44, 63].
3.2 Brute-force Attacks
A brute-force attack or exhaustive key search is the most general attack that can be
applied to any block cipher. All block ciphers are totally breakable in a ciphertext-
only attack, just simply by trying all the possible keys one by one, and checking
whether the computed plaintext is meaningful. If the block size is equal to key
size, in the worst case, this attack requires the computation of 2k encryptions. The
dimension of the key space k, which is the length of the key, determines the prac-
tical feasibility of performing a brute-force attack. While in 2014 an paper written
by Huang and Lai [103] described a brute-force-like attack, with a time complex-
ity faster than the exhaustive key search by going over the entire key space, but
performing less than a full encryption for each possible key. The time complexity
of this attack is 2k(1− ε) (where ε > 0) on average regardless the block size, cf.
[103, 44]. For modern block ciphers, brute-force is always possible in theory, but
computationally infeasible in practice.
3.3 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is a Known Plaintext Attack on block ciphers. It was pop-
ularised by Matsui in 1993 [123] and invented earlier by Gilbert and his student
[163]. A preliminary version of the attack on FEAL was described in 1992 [124].
A year later, Matsui published another attack on DES [123]. Although the published
attack on DES required 243 known plaintexts which is not very practical, it still was
a great improvement in experimental cryptanalysis.
In linear cryptanalysis the attacker exploits linear approximations of some bits
of the plaintext, ciphertext and key. In the attack on the DES (or on DES-like iter-
ated ciphers) the linear approximations are obtained by combining approximations
for each round under the assumption of independent round keys.
The attacker hopes to find an expression (equation 3.1), which holds with prob-
ability pL 6= 12 over the keys [123], such that ε =| pL− 12 |, called the bias, is maxi-
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mal.
(P ·α)⊕ (C ·β ) = (K · γ) (3.1)
where P,C,α,β ,γ are m-bit strings and where ‘·’ denotes the dot product.
Given an approximation (equation 3.1) a linear attack using N plaintexts and
the N corresponding ciphertexts goes as follows [123].
1. for all plaintexts, P, and ciphertexts, C, let T be the number of times the left
hand side of equation 3.1 is 0.
2. if T > N2 guess that K · γ = 0, otherwise guess that K · γ = 1 (majority vote).
By using the above method, the attacker can find one bit of information about the
secret key, K · γ . However, this is only one step in an attack, as it only finds one
bit or a linear equation about the key. Matsui also showed an extended linear attack
which finds more key bits [123]. Instead of approximating the first and last round,
the extended linear attack simply repeats the attack for all values of the relevant key
bits in those two rounds by using the following approximation equation:
(P ·α)⊕ (C ·β )⊕ (F(PR,K1) ·α1)⊕ (F(CR,Kr) ·αr) = (K · γ) (3.2)
where PR,CR are the right halves of the plaintexts and ciphertexts. K1 and KR are
the key bits affecting the linear approximation in the first and rth rounds. We refer
the reader to Matsui’s paper [123] for more details.
Kaliski and Robshaw showed an improved linear attack using multiple linear
approximations in 1994 [110]. In 1996, Knudsen and Robshaw introduced a linear
attack using non-linear approximations in the outer rounds of a block cipher [112].
Both of these have not been able to show any significant improvement compared to
Matsui’s linear attack. Kaliski’s and Knudsen’s attacks seem best suited for ciphers
with large S-boxes, such as LOKI [28, 112]. However in 2004 as an extension
of Knudsen and Robshaw’s work, new attacks were introduced by Courtois [59]
to attack Feistel schemes, which makes this non-linear approximation “penetrate”
inside the cipher and achieved a small improvement upon Matsui’s work.
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3.4 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis is based on tracking changes in the differences between
two messages as they pass through the consecutive rounds of encryption. It is one
of the oldest classical attacks on modern block ciphers. In cryptographic literature,
it was first described and analyzed by Biham and Shamir, and applied to the DES
algorithm in the early 1990s [18]. However, Coppersmith, a member of the IBM
team that designed DES [35, 36, 67], reported that this attack was already known
to IBM designers around 1974. It was known under the name of T-attack or Tickle
attack, and DES had already been designed to resist this type of attack. A detailed
discussion of the specific original design criteria of DES can be found in the work
done by Courtois et al [67]. Moreover, it appears that IBM had agreed with the
NSA that the design criteria of DES should not be made public, precisely because
it would “weaken the competitive advantage the United States enjoyed over other
countries in the field of cryptography” cf. [35, 36]. In contrast, linear cryptanalysis
seems more recent.
Today, differential cryptanalysis is extremely well known. Numerous authors
studied various aspects of differential cryptanalysis extensively in the 1990s. Apart
from DES, differential cryptanalysis has also been successfully applied to a wide
range of iterated ciphers [114, 122]. Recent research work showed great success
using differential cryptanalysis to break the Russian standard GOST [70, 52] and
the NSA lightweight cipher Simon and Speck [19, 4].
Both linear and differential cryptanalysis require lots of data; however a major
difference between these two type of attacks is that differential cryptanalysis works
in a so-called multiple key scenario. In a multiple key scenario, where given 2X
devices with distinct keys, 2Y of data per device, and M = 2Z of memory, some
keys can be recovered at the total cost of T = 2Z [63]. This also appears in the
original Biham and Shamir paper in 1993 [18]. But this attack scenario has only
been discussed in recent years [63]. The fact that differential cryptanalysis works
with data collected from multiple keys (where linear cryptanalysis requires data on a
single key) makes differential cryptanalysis more practical than linear cryptanalysis,
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as it’s easier for an attacker to get data from multiple keys than a single key in
practice.
The main task of differential cryptanalysis is to studies the propagation of input
differences from round to round inside the encryption system, and to find specific
differences that propagate with high probability. Such plaintext and ciphertext pair
(P/C pairs) can be used to recover some bits of the secret key. In general, differ-
ential cryptanalysis exposes the non-uniform distribution of the output differences
given one or several input differences. However, what really matters in differential
cryptanalysis is that some special events can happen at least once within a given
attack requirements.
Definition 5. A difference between two bit strings, X and X ′ of equal length is
defined as
4X = X⊗ (X ′)−1
where ⊗ is the group operation on the group of bit strings used to combine the key
with the text input in the round function and (X)−1 is the inverse element of X with
respect to ⊗
Generally, the selection of the operator ⊗ depends on the way the round sub-
keys are introduced in each round. As many ciphers use XOR for the key application
in round function, the operator in Definition 5 is usually exclusive-or (⊕).
The attacker then computes the differences of the corresponding ciphertexts,
hoping to detect statistical patterns in their distribution. The resulting pair of differ-
ences is called a differential. Their statistical properties depend upon the internal
structure of the cipher. The attacker aims to find one particular ciphertext differ-
ence that is especially frequent. In this way, the cipher can be distinguished from
random.
Some differential cryptanalysis work study multiple input / output differences,
such as truncated differentials (which we will discuss later), and the work presented
in 2009 by Courtois [60] for cloning MiFare Classic building passes.
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Truncated Differentials
Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis is a generalization of differential cryptanalysis
developed by Lars Knudsen in 1995 [113]. Unlike differential cryptanalysis, which
studies the propagation of the full difference between two plaintexts, truncated dif-
ferential cryptanalysis considers differences that are partially determined, since in
some ciphers it is possible and advantageous to predict the values of parts of the
differences after each round. This technique has been successfully applied to many
block ciphers, such as Camellia [159], TEA and XTEA [102], and Russian standard
GOST [61, 126, 72]. Truncated differential cryptanalysis has also been extensively
studied by Mourouzis in his PhD thesis [126]. Truncated differential is defined as
follows [113].
Definition 6. Let a = a0a1...an−1 be an n-bit string, then its truncation is the n-
bit string b given by b0b1...bn−1 = T RUNC(a0a1...an−1), where either bi = ai or
bi = ∗, for all 0≤ i≤ n−1 and ∗ is an unknown value
Definition 7. A differential that predicts only parts of a n-bit value is called a trun-
cated differential. More formally, let (a,b) be an i-round differential. If a
′
is a
truncation of a and b
′
is a truncation of b, then (a
′
,b
′
) is called an i-round trun-
cated differential.
A truncated differential can be considered as a collection of differentials.
For example, for an i-round 64-bit block cipher, a truncated differential ∆ =
[0000022200000080] in hexadecimal (which appears later in Section 6.2) is a col-
lection of 24− 1 differentials (a,b) where a and b can take any of the following
values:
00000200 00000000 00000020 00000000 00000002 00000000
00000000 00000080 00000220 00000000 00000202 00000000
00000200 00000080 00000022 00000000 00000020 00000080
00000002 00000080 00000222 00000000 00000220 00000080
00000202 00000080 00000022 00000080 00000222 00000080
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3.5 Algebraic Attacks
In general, the security of a given block cipher will grow exponentially with the
number of rounds and so does the number of required Plaintext/Ciphertext pairs
that are needed in a linear and differential cryptanalytic attack. However, in most
cases, only a few Plaintext/Ciphertext pairs are available for cryptanalysis, so linear
or differential attacks are not expected to succeed. Thus, a new method needs to be
invented that will be able to recover the secret key when only a very limited amount
of data is available..
Claude Shannon, once suggested that the security of a cipher should be related
to the difficulty of solving the underlying system of equations and deriving the key:
“if we could show that solving a certain system requires at least as
much work as solving a system of simultaneous equations in a large
number of unknowns, of a complex type, then we would have a lower
bound of sorts for the work characteristic” [150].
This is the core concept behind algebraic attacks. An algebraic attack is a form of
Known Plaintext Attack which consists of the following two steps:
1. Modelling: Describe the cipher as a multivariate system of polynomial equa-
tions over a small finite field (like F2) or logical constraints in terms of the
secret key K, the plaintext P and the ciphertext C.
f1(K,P,C) = 0, ... fr(K,P,C) = 0⇐⇒ E(K,P) =C
2. Solving: Solve the underlying multivariate system of equations and obtain
the secret key. In order to reduce the complexity of solving the system, we
substitute all known Plaintext/Ciphertext pairs. The more pairs that are sub-
stituted, the more the equations we obtain involving the key bits. For many
known attacks, this can make the problem easier to solve.
Generally, each module of a block cipher can be described with a set of alge-
braic equations. By putting these algebraic equations together, we can get a large
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precise system representing the whole cipher. The main idea of an algebraic at-
tack is to establish a series of low complexity algebraic equations of initial plaintext
and ciphertext, and then find the secret key by solving the equations. Such equation
systems are normally very large systems of quadratic multivariate polynomial equa-
tions over F2. Each variable represents a state-bit of the encryption algorithm. Then
the variables that represent state-bits from the initial round are set according to the
corresponding actual values of the plaintext; similarly variables that represent state-
bits from the last round are set according to the corresponding actual values of the
bits of the ciphertext. Therefore, the security of a block cipher depends on whether
an efficient algorithm exists to solve such large and sparse multivariate polynomial
equations. If we can solve the equation system faster than an exhaustive key search
attack, the cipher will be broken (in an academic sense).
Figure 3.1: Toy example for modelling Simon block cipher with a multivariate quadratic
equation system. The upper part is the main block encryption with extended
keys generated by a key schedule1(lower part).
In addition, some high profile cryptanalysis problems in public key cryptogra-
phy can be written in a form that contains a block cipher topology 2. Such equations
have a similar structure to a block cipher, where the beginning inputs and final out-
1The key schedule here has a specific recursive form in popular ciphers such as DES, AES and
Simon which optimizes storage or chip size and timing.
2 This is basically a property of the equations proposed by Semaev in 2015 [145, 147], they have
the same structure as on Figure 3.2 with variables progressively more and more remote from the
constraints which make that the system of equations have a unique solution. The key point is that
this sort of configuration leads to a system of equations which is really very hard to solve in the same
way as in algebraic attacks on block ciphers.
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puts variables are easy to get and the middle part of the equation system is very
hard to analyse (see Figure 3.2). One example is Semaev’s summation polynomial
equations studied in elliptic curve cryptanalysis [145, 147] see Section 4.5.2.
Figure 3.2: Block cipher topology: the attacker can control or manipulate the inputs and
the outputs but it is quite hard to say anything about the variables in the middle
3.5.1 Algebraic Attacks Solving Stage
Solving a random system of multivariate non-linear boolean equations is an NP-
hard problem [93]. As many cryptographic primitives can be described by a sparse
multivariate non-linear system of equations over F2 or any other algebraic systems,
several techniques were developed to tackle the problem of solving these equations.
A classic approach is to use techniques from algebraic geometry, especially Gro¨bner
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bases algorithms, to solve the system of equations [87]. But most of the time they
do not lead to solutions in practice due to the extremely high memory requirements.
Subsequently, some heuristic techniques were developed called linearization [51],
where all the non-linear terms are replaced by an independent linear variable and the
resulting linear system can be solved using Gaussian elimination [149]. However,
this requires there to be enough linearly independent equations and that the initial
system be highly over-defined and sparse. Then, the XL algorithm [51, 75] was
developed to make the system over-defined by adding new equations to the current
system. The XL proposal made it possible to solve the multi-order non-linear equa-
tions within polynomial time, which accelerated the development of the algebraic
attacks. Then researchers focused mainly on fast solutions to the algebraic equation
systems.
Since 2006, Courtois and Bard discovered that this problem could be solved
using tools and software [65], such as SAT solvers. SAT solvers are automated
software solvers which aim to solve one of the original NP-complete problems, the
so-called Boolean Satisfiability Problem.
Definition 8. [Boolean Satisfiability Problem] The SAT problem in Conjunctive
Normal Form (CNF) consists of the conjunction ( ∧ representing the Boolean AND
connective) of a number of clauses, where a clause is a disjunction ( ∨ representing
the Boolean OR connective) of a number of propositions or their negations (liter-
als).
If xi represent propositions that can assume only the values True (≡ 1≡>) or
False (≡ 0≡⊥), then an example formula in CNF would be:
(x0∨ x2∨ x3)∧ (x3)∧ (x1∨¬x2)
where ¬xi is the negation of xi. Given a set of clauses C0,C1, ...,Cm−1 on the propo-
sitions x0,x1, ...,xn−1, the problem is to determine whether the formula
F =
∧
j<m
C j
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has an assignment of truth values to the propositions such that it evaluates to True.
In the past decade, the rapid improvements in SAT algorithms has made SAT
solvers increasingly popular. Modern SAT solvers have a significant impact on the
fields of electronic design automation, software verification, constraint solving in
artificial intelligence, and operations research, among others. Nicolas Courtois is
the pioneer of bringing SAT solvers into action in the area of symmetric cryptanal-
ysis. His paper [10] described how to convert a multivariate quadratic equation
system to CNF which can be solved automatically by SAT solvers. The advantage
of this technique is that SAT solvers can perform reasonably well and do not re-
quire a lot of memory as compared with Gro¨bner basis-based techniques [88]. The
only disadvantage is the unpredictability of its complexity. The first algebraic attack
on reduced-round block cipher DES was done by Courtois and Bard in 2007 [48].
Later in 2008, the first algebraic attack on full block cipher KeeLoq [66] took place.
In the past 10 years, SAT solvers have been used for attacks on block ciphers, such
as GOST [69, 44], KATAN32 [11] and the Chinese block cipher SMS4 [85], stream
ciphers, such as Crypto-1, HiTag2 and Bivium [155, 73], and MiFare Classic smart
cards [56].
Another method is to use the ElimLin algorithm [58]. ElimLin stands for
Eliminate Linear, and it is a simple algorithm for solving polynomial systems of
multivariate equations over small finite fields. It was initially proposed as a single
tool by Courtois to attack DES and CTC/CTC2 ciphers [48]. It is also known as the
inter-reduction step in all major algebra systems. Its main aim is to reveal some hid-
den linear equations existing in the ideal generated by the system of polynomials.
ElimLin is composed of two sequential stages:
• Gaussian Elimination: To discover all the linear equations in the linear span
of initial equations.
• Substitution: Variables are iteratively eliminated in the whole system based
on the linear equations found until no linear equation is left.
Given an initial multivariate system of equations over S0 in F2[x1,x2, ..,xn],
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then the ElimLin is formally described in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 ElimLin Algorithm
Input: S0 = { f1, f2, ..., fm} ∈ F2[x1,x2, ..,xn]
Output: An updated system of equations ST and a system of linear equations SL
1. Set SL← Ø and ST ← S0 and k← 1
2. Repeat
For some ordering of equations and monomials perform Gauss(ST ) to eliminate
non-linear monomials
Set SL′ ← Linear Equations from Gauss(ST )
Set ST ← Gauss(ST )\SL′
for ∀l ∈ SL′ , l non-trivial (if l=1and unsolvable then terminate) do
Let xik be a monomial in l
Substitute xik in S
T and SL′ and replace by l− xik
Insert l in SL
end for
k← k+1
The study of ElimLin is interesting [160, 161] precisely because it is sim-
pler to understand than more complex polynomial algebra techniques [51, 74, 168,
12, 101]. In recent years, ElimLin has been applied to NSA block cipher Simon,
LBlock, KATAN32 and PRESENT [55, 137, 161, 127]. The main characteristic of
ElimLin is that it quietly dissolves and makes non-linear equations disappear and
generates linear equations. Non-linearity is the main and only thing which makes
cryptographic schemes not broken by simple linear algebra. Intuitively, ElimLin
seems to work better in cases where there is low non-linearity, since this implies
the existence of more linear equations. Multiplicative complexity (MC) is another
notion of non-linearity which was studied in Mourouzis’s PhD thesis [126] and pos-
sibly Elimlin may work sufficiently well in cryptographic primitives with low MC.
However, the complexity of ElimLin attack or software algebraic attacks in general
is not well studied. It is not clear why this works and how well the ElimLin attack
scales for larger systems of equations. This is a major topic of interest in this thesis.
3.5.2 Algebraic Complexity Reduction
In order to break a full cipher, algebraic attacks are normally combined with other
cryptanalysis techniques to reduce the solving complexity. This attack scenario
consists of two independent tasks: one is how a reduced-round cipher can be solved
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by software algebraic cryptanalysis which we will discuss in Chapter 5-7. The other
task is called algebraic complexity reduction [62, 44], which focuses on how the
complexity of solving a full round cipher can be reduced to a problem of breaking a
cipher with much fewer rounds. Algebraic complexity reduction raises an important
optimization problem in algebraic cryptanalysis: one needs to minimize the costs
(regarding the probability that our assumptions hold) and to maximize the benefits
(regarding the number and the complexity of interesting relations which hold under
these assumptions). Amplification which was introduced by Courtois and Debraize
in 2008 [68] is a notion which occurs in such optimization problems.
Definition 9 (Amplification, Informal). The goal of the attacker is to find a reduc-
tion where he makes some assumptions at a certain initial cost. For example they
are true with probability 2−X or work for certain proportion 2−Z of keys. Then the
attacker can in constant time determine many other internal bits inside the cipher
to the total of Y bits.
We are only interested in cases in which the values X and Z are judged realis-
tically for a given attack, for example Z < 32 and X < 128.
We call amplification the ratio A = Y/X.
The idea of amplification is to gain additional information inside the cipher
with low cost. Amplification is also a general cryptanalysis principle which can
apply to many cryptanalysis attacks. For example, a guess-then-determine process
can be seen as a form of amplification. With the cost of guessing, attackers gain
additional information about the key bits which might lead to knowledge about
many other bits inside the cipher. Gordon Welchman’s diagonal board is also a form
of amplification which makes Turing’s Bombe machine gain additional information
about Enigma encryption settings [37].
3.6 Cryptanlysis of GOST Block Cipher
The Russian encryption standard GOST 28147-89 is an important government stan-
dard [97]. Its large key size of 256 bits makes GOST a plausible alternative for
AES-256 and 3-key triple DES. This indicates that GOST means to be a serious
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cipher for serious applications and at least two sets of GOST S-boxes have been ex-
plicitly identified as being used by the most prominent Russian banks, cf. [142, 1].
3.6.1 GOST And ISO Standardisation.
The cost of cryptography is still an important problem for the industry. For ex-
ample it was only around 2010 that Intel implemented an encryption algorithm in
some of its CPUs, and nowadays both Intel and AMD have very good support for
AES-NI instructions. It is therefore very important to notice that, in addition to
the very long bit keys, GOST has a much lower implementation cost than AES or
any other comparable encryption algorithm. For example, in hardware GOST 256
bits requires less than 800 GE3, while AES-128 requires 3100 GE [134]. Thus it
is not surprising that GOST became an Internet standard. It is part of many crypto
libraries such as OpenSSL [1], and is also increasingly popular outside its country
of origin [134]. It is hard to think about a better algorithm for the industry because
of its ultra-low implementation cost and 20 years of cryptanalysis efforts behind
it [134]. In 2010 GOST was submitted to ISO 18033 to become a worldwide en-
cryption standard. Less than 10 block ciphers have ever become an ISO standard.
Unhappily in 2011 several key recovery attacks on GOST were found by researchers
[106, 62, 44, 70, 61].
3.6.2 Cryptanalysis of GOST
The turning point in the security of GOST was the discovery of the so called “Re-
flection” property described by Kara in Indocrypt 2008 [111].
The reflection property in GOST is based on its key schedule. GOST is a
Feistel cipher with 32 rounds. In each round we have a round function fk(X) with a
32-bit sub-key which is the original 256-bit key divided into eight 32-bit segments
k = (k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7). One 32-bit sub-key is used in each round, and their
exact order is shown in Table 3.1:
Follow Kara’s work in Indocrypt 2008 [111], we write GOST as the following
3GE: (informally) 1 GE is equivalent to 1 AND gate
3.6. Cryptanlysis of GOST Block Cipher 51
Table 3.1: Key schedule in GOST
rounds 1 8 9 1617 2425 32
keys k0k1k2k3k4k5k6k7k0k1k2k3k4k5k6 k7 k0 k1k2k3k4k5k6 k7 k7 k6k5k4k3k2k1 k0
functional decomposition (to be read from right to left)
Enck =D◦S◦ ε ◦ ε ◦ ε
where ε is the first 8 rounds which exploits the whole 256-bit key, S is a swap
function which exchanges the left and right hand sides and does not depend on the
key, and D is the corresponding decryption function with ε ◦D=D◦ ε = Id.
Initially at Indocrypt 2008 only a weak-key attack with time complexity of 2192
was proposed, with a large proportion of 2−32 of weak keys. Then in 2011, Courtois
propsed an algebraic complex reduction attack which break full 32 rounds GOST
using pure algebraic cryptanalysis.
Assumption 3. [62] Let A be such that ε(D) =D where D is defined as D= ε3(A).
Fact 1. [62] Given 264 known plaintext there is on average one value A which
satisfies Assumption 3. For 63% of all GOST keys at least one such A exists.
Fact 2. [62] If A satisfies the Assumption 3 and defining B = ε(A) and C = ε(B)
we have:
1. Enck(A) = D. This is illustrated on the right hand side of Figure 3.3
2. Enck(B) =C. This can be seen on the left hand side of Figure 3.3
From 264 KP for 32 Rounds to 4 KP for 8 Rounds: Given 264 known plaintexts
for GOST, it is possible to obtain 4 P/C pairs for 8 rounds of GOST and our guess
will be correct with probability 2128. Thus we obtained 4 pairs for 8 rounds of
GOST: A→ B,B→ C,C→ D,D→ D. As a result breaking 4 P/C pairs 8 rounds
of GOST become the last step of breaking full GOST. Courtois said in his papaer
the time complexity of breaking 8 rounds GOST is 2120 [62]. In this thesis we
look precisely at questions pertaining to cryptanalysing 8 rounds GOST with less
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Figure 3.3: Algebraic Complexity Reduction from 32 to 8 rounds of GOST. Due to GOST’s
self similiarity in the key schedule, the problem of breaking full 32 rounds can
be reduced to 8 rounds. The idea is to find 2 Known Plaintext A and B that has
properties shown in this figure.
or equal than 4 P/C pairs which can be used as a plugin to replace already known
attacks on full GOST.
Many attacks which do not use any reflections have also been proposed [44,
62, 82] and also differential attacks which do not fall into the algebraic complexity
reduction category. The most recent advanced differential attack on GOST has a
time complexity of 2178 [70, 61] which is also the best single-key attack known.
3.6.3 The Internal Structure of GOST
GOST is a block cipher with a simple Feistel structure, 64-bit block size, 256-bit
keys and 32 rounds. Each round contains a key addition modulo 232, a set of 8
bijective S-boxes on 4 bits, and a simple rotation by 11 positions.
GOST has 32 identical rounds such as the one described on Figure 3.4 below.
They differ only by the subsets of 32 key bits which they use. GOST has a weak
key schedule which is the main source of all the attacks on full 32-round GOST
[62, 44, 106, 71, 70, 52, 61, 82]. In this thesis we only look at up to 8 rounds of
GOST which have independent 32-bit keys and don’t repeat.
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We number the inputs of the S-box Si for i = 1,2, . . . ,8 by integers from 4i+1
to 4i+4 out of 1..32 and its outputs are numbered according to their final positions
after the rotation by 11 positions: for example the inputs of S6 are 21,22,23,24 and
the outputs are 32,1,2,3.
Figure 3.4: One Round of GOST And Connections in The Following Round. This figure
describes the encryption process for one round of GOST. Firstly, the 32-bit
right half is added with ki (modulo 232, showed in figure as  ). Then, the
result is divided into eight 4-bit consecutive blocks and each block is given as
input to a different S-box. The first 4 bits go into the first S-box S1, bits 5-8 go
into S2 and so on. Then, the 32-bit output undergoes a 11-bit left circular shift
and finally the result is xored to the left 32-bit half of the data.
In Figure 3.4 we also show S-box numbers in the next round in the left mar-
gin. This is very helpful in order to see which bits are successfully determined in
our attacks on GOST. In a great simplification, in most cases, one S-box in one
round affects essentially only two consecutive S-boxes in the next round. Addi-
tional propagation is obtained due to the Feistel structure and due to carries in the
modular addition.
Modular Addition: The GOST cipher uses addition modulo 232 for key in-
sertion which is another source of introducing non-linearity in the cipher. Here
we explain how to algebraically encode modular addition, which is the modelling
step of algebraic cryptanalysis. The modular addition of two n-bit words x; y is
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algebraically described as follows
(x,y) 7→ z = x+ y mod 2n (3.3)
The resulting n-bit word (zn−1, ...,z0) is given by:
z0 = x0+ y0
z1 = x1+ y1+ c1
z2 = x2+ y2+ c2
.
zi = xi+ yi+ ci
.
zn−1 = xn−1+ yn−1+ cn−1
where, 
c1 = x0y0
c2 = x1y1+ c1(x1+ y1)
.
ci = xi−1yi−1+ ci−1(xi−1+ yi−1)
.
cn−1 = xn−2+ yn−2+ cn−2(xn−2+ yn−2)
3.7 Cryptanalysis of SIMON Block Cipher
Nowadays lightweight cryptography is rapidly evolving and becoming more and
more important due to the increasing demand from mobile phones and the Internet
of Things. These lightweight cryptographic primitives are designed to be efficient
(in both hardware and software) when limited hardware resources are available and
at the same time to guarantee a desired level of security. The design of such prim-
itives is a great challenge and can be seen as a non-trivial optimization problem,
where several trade-offs are taken into account. They need to maintain a reasonable
balance between security and efficient software and hardware implementation with
very low overall cost with respect to several meaningful metrics (power consump-
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tion, energy consumption, size of the circuit [50, 23, 25]).
The research community has proposed many lightweight hash functions, block
ciphers and stream ciphers which are reasonably good and satisfy at a reasonable
level the trade-off between efficiency and security. Nowadays, in cryptographic lit-
erature we find lots of such lightweight cryptographic primitives such as KATAN
[30], KLEIN [96], ICEBERG [158], HIGHT [80], LED [99], mCrypton [120],
PRESENT [20], Piccolo [152] and many others.
In July 2013, a team from the NSA proposed two new families of particularly
lightweight block ciphers, Simon and Speck, both coming in a variety of blocks and
key sizes [14]. We have developed a basic reference implementation of both ciphers
which can be found on Github [54], as well as a generator of algebraic equations to
be used in algebraic attacks.
The designers of Simon and Speck published the full specifications and pre-
sented only performance and implementation footprints, without providing any ad-
vanced security analysis against known cryptanalytic attacks. Both of them offer
excellent performance on both hardware and software platforms and perform ex-
ceptionally well across the majority of lightweight applications and not only on a
single platform. Compared to other lightweight cryptographic primitives, these two
are meant to have better performance with respect to the area needed for a given
throughput, code size and memory usage. Simon is designed for optimal perfor-
mance in hardware, and Speck for optimal performance in software. According to
Aysu’s analysis [7], Simon with an equivalent security level as AES, is 86% smaller
than AES, 70% smaller than PRESENT and its smallest hardware architecture only
costs 36 slices (72 look-up tables, 30 registers). Recent results about hardware im-
plementation of block ciphers emphasize reducing the size and/or Multiplicative
Complexity (MC) further possibly leads to optimal implementations [24, 50].
However, in the original NSA paper [14], there is no analysis of the security
of these 2 ciphers against major well-known attacks. In the same paper [14], the
authors briefly said that Simon and Speck were designed to provide security against
traditional adversaries who can adaptively encrypt and decrypt large amounts of
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data, and some attention was given so that there are no related-key attacks. Except
for these comments, no more analysis against common attacks such as linear or
differential cryptanalysis was presented and the task of analyzing the resistance of
the ciphers against known attacks was left to the academic community. Immedi-
ately after the release of the specifications we had the first attempts using differen-
tial, linear and rotational cryptanalysis [86, 4]. Our attacks on Simon described in
Chapter 6 were the first algebraic cryptanalysis attacks attempted on Simon. The
work was published in 2014 [55]. In recent years Simon was studied heavily by a
lot of researchers, including differential attacks introduced by Biryukov et al [19],
Mourouzis et al [3] and Wang et al [165, 166], also combined differential and lin-
ear attacks by Farzaneh et al [86] and Alkhzaimi et al [4]. Most of them are using
statistical cryptanalysis techniques, the best results break around 70% rounds of
different versions of Simon. In 2015, Raddum [138] published another algebraic
cryptanalysis work on Simon for most of the versions (not including Simon 64/128
version). Raddum’s work uses more P/C pairs than our attack and breaks 16 (out of
72) rounds of Simon 128/256 version with ElimLin. This attack shows that there is
a need to understand better how ElimLin attacks can scale to larger attacks.
3.7.1 SIMON Structure
SIMON is a family of lightweight block ciphers with the aim of havingan opti-
mal hardware performance [14]. It follows the classical Feistel design paradigm4,
operating on two n-bit halves in each round and thus the general block size is
2n. The Simon block cipher with an n-bit word is denoted by Simon-2n, where
n = 16,24,32,48 or 64, and if it uses an m-word key (equivalently mn-bit key) we
denote it as Simon-2n/mn. In this chapter, we study the variant of Simon with
n = 32 and m = 4 (i.e. 128-bit key).
Each round of Simon applies a non-linear, non-bijective (and as a result non-
invertible) function
F : GF(2)n→ GF(2)n (3.4)
4Note that in classical Feistel structure computation is done on left side, see 2.2.3. In Simon
computation is done on right side see Figure 3.5
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to the left half of the state which is repeated for 44 rounds. The operations used
are as follows:
1. bitwise XOR, ⊕
2. bitwise AND,
3. left circular shift, S j by j bits.
We denote the input to the i-th round by Li−1||Ri−1 and in each round the left
word Li−1 is used as input to the round function F defined by,
F(Li−1) = (Li−1 <<< 1)∧ (Li−1 <<< 8)⊕ (Li−1 <<< 2) (3.5)
Then, the next state Li||Ri is computed as follows (cf. Fig. 3.5),
Li = Ri−1⊕F(Li−1)⊕Ki−1 (3.6)
Ri = Li−1 (3.7)
Figure 3.5: The round function of Simon
The output of the last round is the ciphertext.
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3.7.2 Key Schedule
The key schedule of Simon is based on an Linear-Feedback Shift Register(LSFR)-
like procedure [121], where the nm-bits of the key are used to generate the keys
K0,K1, ...,Kr−1 to be used in each round. There are three different key schedule
procedures depending on the number of words that the secret key consists of (m =
2,3,4).
At the beginning, the first m words K0,K1, ...,Km−1 are initialized with the
secret key, while the remaining are generated by the LSFR-like construction. For the
variant of interest, where m = 4, the remaining keys are generated in the following
way:
Y = Ki+1⊕ (Ki+3 >>> 3) (3.8)
Ki+4 = Ki⊕Y ⊕ (Y >>> 1)⊕ c⊕ (z j)i (3.9)
The constant c = 0x f f ... f c is used for preventing slide attacks and attacks ex-
ploiting rotational symmetries [14]. In addition, the generated subkeys are XORed
with a bit (z j)i, that denotes the i-th bit from the one of the five constant sequences
z0, ...,z4. These sequences are defined in the NSA’s orginial paper [14] and for our
variant we use z3. We have implemented a basic reference implementation of Si-
mon and Speck ciphers and a basic generator of equations that are used in algebraic
attacks [54] .
The Feistel network, the construction of the round function and the key gen-
eration of Simon, enables bit-serial hardware architectures which can significantly
reduce the cost of implementation [7]. Additionally, encryption and decryption can
be done using the same hardware.
3.8 Summary
Algebraic cryptanalysis attacks allow the cryptanalyst to recover secret key bits
given only one or very few plaintext / ciphertext pairs. However, one of the funda-
mental problems of algebraic cryptanalysis is that the runtime of algebraic attacks
against block ciphers is not well understood. In 2007, Courtois and Bard said in the
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first paper describing an algebraic attack on block cipher [48]:
“Very little is known about what approach would make an algebraic
attack efficient and why.”
Up to today, this question still remains in algebraic cryptanalysis. At the mo-
ment most of the exising Algebraic Cryptanalysis applications are just coverting
target ciphers to equation systems and then solved directly by a software solver
(i.e ElimLin or SAT solvers). Very limited research has been done in order to un-
derstand the behavior of a solver and how to make the coverted equation system
become easier to solve.
On cryptanalysis of block ciphers we introduced two well known encryption
standards: Russian GOST and NSA SIMON. We reviewed the state of art crypt-
analysis works on these encryption standards: best algebraic cryptanalysis attack
on 8 rounds GOST require time complexity of 2120 and no algebraic cryptanalysis
has been done on SIMON. The above facts motivate our research work decribed in
Part II of the thesis.
In Chapter 5 we will introduce a fundemental notion of “contradiction immu-
nity“ and describe how conradiction can be used in algebraic cryptanalysis. We will
demostrate a mixed SAT/UNSAT attack on GOST which improve the time com-
plexity of current best attack on breaking 8 rounds of GOST from 2120 to 292. In
Chapter 6 we will describe a new Algebraic Cryptanalysis approach combined with
well selected P/C paris in a Chosen Plaintext Attack scenario and benchmark our
attacks with randomly selected P/C pairs. We will apply this method in newly pro-
posed NSA cipher SIMON and provide the first Algebraic Cryptanalysis on SIMON
block cipher. Finally in Chapter 7 we will study the behavior of ElimLin method
with regards to the number of data samples availiable to an attacker. By studying the
number of linear independent equations found by ElimLin, we will show ElimLin
has a phase transition process where the number of equations found by ElimLin in-
crease much faster than linear and eventually break the cipher. We will then inspect
where the faster than linear groth come from and study how to find more equations
that ElimLin can not yet find.
Chapter 4
Introduction to Elliptic Curves
4.1 Mathematical Foundations [100]
Finite Groups
A Finite Group is a set G with a finite number of q elements, which has a binary
operation ∗ : G∗G→ G and satisfies the following properties [100]:
1. Associativity: (a∗b)∗ c = a∗ (b∗ c) for all elements a,b,c ∈ G
2. Existence of an identity: there exists an element e∈G such that a∗e= e∗a=
a for all a ∈ G. Element e is called the neutral element (or identity element)
of the group.
3. Existence of inverses: for each element a ∈ G, there exists an element b ∈ G
such that a∗b = b∗a = e. Element b is called the inverse of a.
q is called the group order. In addition, a group is called Abelian group (or com-
mutative group) if it satisfies the commutativity law which is a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all
elements a,b ∈ G.
If the binary operation is called addition (+), then the group is additive. In
this case, the neutral element is usually denoted by 0 and the additive inverse of
an element a is denoted by −a. If the binary operation is called multiplication (·),
then the finite group is multiplicative. In this case, the identity element is usually
denoted by 1 and the multiplicative inverse of an element a is denoted by a−1.
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Finite Fields
Abstractly, a finite field consists of a finite set of objects called field elements to-
gether with the description of two operations, addition and multiplication, that can
be performed on pairs of field elements. These operations must have certain prop-
erties: [100]
1. (F,+) is an Abelian group with (additive) neutral element denoted by 0.
2. (F, ·) is an Abelian group with (multiplicative) neutral element denoted by 1.
3. The distributive law holds: (a+b) · c = a · c+b · c for all a,b,c ∈ F.
Prime Fields
Let p be a prime number. The residues modulo p, consisting of the integers
{0,1,2, . . . , p−1} with addition and multiplication performed modulo p, is a finite
field of order p.
Binary Fields
Finite fields of order 2m are called binary fields or characteristic-two finite fields.
One way to construct F2m is to use a polynomial basis representation. The elements
of F2m are the binary polynomials (polynomials whose coefficients are in the field
F2 = {0,1}) of degree at most m−1:
F2m =
{
am−1zm−1+ · · ·+a2z2+a1z1+a0 : ai ∈ F2;+, ·
}
.
An irreducible binary polynomial f (z) of degree m is chosen. Irreducibility of
f (z) means that f (z) cannot be factored as a product of binary polynomials each of
degree less than m. Addition of field elements is the usual addition of polynomials,
with coefficient reduced modulo 2. Multiplication of field elements is performed as
multiplication of polynomials modulo the polynomial f (z).
Cyclic Groups
Let G be a finite group of order q with multiplication (·) as binary operation, g be a
group element of G, then the order of g is the smallest positive integer r for which
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gr = 1. G is called cyclic if there exist a g such that 〈g〉= {gi : 0≤ i≤ r−1} is the
subgroup of G generated by g. If r = q then G is a cyclic group with generator g if
G = 〈g〉. The set 〈g〉 is also a group itself under the same binary operation and is
called the cyclic subgroup of G generated by g.
4.2 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve over a field K is defined by a set of points which satisfy the fol-
lowing equation (also known as standard Weierstrass form) and a group operation
which will be defined later.
y3+a1xy+a3y = x3+a2x2+a4x+a6 (4.1)
Here: a1,a2,a3,a4,a6 ∈ K, and the discriminant is defined as
∆=−d22d8−8d34−27d26 +9d2d4d6 6= 0
where
d2 = a21+4a2
d4 = 2a4+a1a3
d6 = a23+4a6
d8 = a21a6+4a2a6−a1a3a4+a2a23−a24
The condition ∆ 6= 0 guarantees that there does not exist more than one tangent line
for a given point on the curve.
For an elliptic curve over a field K of characteristic 6= 2 or 3, without loss
of generality, one can assume that a1 = a2 = a3 = 0, we have d2 = 0, d4 = 2a4,
d6 = 4a6 and d8 =−a24 [100]. Accordingly, the condition ∆=−16(4a34+27a26) 6= 0
can be simplified to 4a34+27a
2
6 6= 0. Consequently in practical application of elliptic
curves, the curve equation is written in the following form:
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y3 = x3+ax+b (4.2)
where a = a4 and b = a6, cf. Equation 4.1.
For an elliptic curve over binary fields Fm2 , without loss of generality, one can
assume that a1 = 1, a3 = a4 = 0 [100]. Then we have d2 = 1, d4 = 0, d6 = 0 and
d8 = a6 1, and ∆ = −a6 6= 0. The short form of curve equation is normally written
as follows:
y2+ xy = x3+ax2+b (4.3)
where a = a2 and b = a6 and a,b ∈ Fm2 .
4.2.1 Elliptic Curves Over Fp
The finite field Fp uses the numbers from 0 to p− 1, and computations are done
modulo p. An Elliptic Curve over finite field Fp where p is a large prime, can be
formed by choosing the constants a and b within the field Fp. The elliptic curve
includes all points (x,y) which satisfy the elliptic curve equation modulo p (where
x and y are numbers in Fp). It is typically defined in the short Weierstrass form:
y2 mod p = x3+ax+b mod p
where a,b∈Fp satisfy 4a3+27b2 mod p is not 0, which guarantees x3+ax+b
contains no repeated factors and then the elliptic curve is a group. The elliptic curve
contains all points P= (x,y) for x,y∈ Fp that satisfy the elliptic curve equation with
addition of (for Weierstrass curves) a special point O called the point at infinity 2.
To give an example, consider an elliptic curve over the field F19, where a = 1
and b = 6, the curve equation is: y2 = x3+ x+6, an example used in [8]. There are
18 points:
(0,5), (4,6), (2,4), (3,6), (14,3), (12,13),
(18,2), (10,3), (6,0), (10,16), (18,17), (12,16),
1In binary fields anything multiplied by 2 equals to 0.
2In code implementation, O is normally be represented as point (0,0), but not always, as (0,0)
might satisfy the curve equation.
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(14,16), (3,13), (2,15), (4,13), (0,14), O
The point P = (4,6) satisfies this equation since:
62 mod 19 = 43+4+6 mod 19
17 = 17
Remark: In mod p Weierstrass curves −(x,y) = (x,−y)
4.2.2 Binary Elliptic Curves
Elements of the field F2m are m-bit strings. The rules for arithmetic in binary field
can be defined by either polynomial basis or by so-called (more efficient) [optimal]
normal basis[2]. An elliptic curve E with the underlying field F2m is given through
the following equation:
y2+ xy = x3+ax2+b
where x,y,a,b ∈ F2m and b 6= 0. The elliptic curve E includes all points (x,y) which
satisfy the curve equation over F2m , together with a point at infinity O .
To given an example, assume the finite field F24 has irreducible polynomial
f (x) = x4 + x+ 1 (or 0x13 in hex). The element g = (0010) is a generator for the
field. The powers of g are:
g0 = (0001),g1 = (0010),g2 = (0100),g3 = (1000),g4 = (0011),g5 = (0110)
g6 = (1100),g7 = (1011),g8 = (0101),g9 = (1010),g10 = (0111),g11 = (1110)
g12 = (1111),g13 = (1101),g14 = (1001),g15 = (0001)
Consider the elliptic curve y2+xy = x3+g4x2+1. The points on E are the follow-
ing and shown in Figure 4.1.
(1,g13),(g3,g13),(g5,g11),(g6,g14),(g9,g13),(g10,g8),(g12,g12),
(1,g6),(g3,g8),(g5,g3),(g6,g8),(g9,g10),(g10,g),(g12,0),(0,1),O
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Figure 4.1: Example of elliptic curve over F24 [32]
4.3 Point Arithmetic
Point Addition for Prime Curves
Let P and Q be two distinct points on an elliptic curve, and P not equals to −Q.
To add the points P and Q, a line 3 is drawn through the two points. This line will
have exactly one additional intersection point with the elliptic curve, which we call
−R. The point −R is “reflected” in the x-axis to obtain point R. The law for point
addition in an elliptic curve group is P+Q = R. An example of geometrical graph
is given in Figure 4.2.
For point addition of P and −P, the line through P and −P is a vertical line
which does not intersect the elliptic curve at a third point. Thus the point P and −P
cannot be added using the above method. In this case we define P+(−P) = O .
3line is a set of points which satisfy the equation Ax+By+C = 0 where A,B,C ∈ Fp
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Figure 4.2: Elliptic curve point addition [136]
Point Doubling for Prime Curves
Adding a point P(x,y) to itself, a so-called tangent line to the curve is drawn at point
P. If y is not zero, then the tangent line has exact one intersection with the curve at
point−Q. −Q is reflected in the x-axis to point Q. This operation is called doubling
the point P, and the law for doubling is the following (also shown in Figure 4.3):
P+P = 2P = Q
Doubling the point P(x,y) while y = 0 then the tangent line to the curve is ver-
tical and does not intersect the curve on any other point. For such a P, by definition,
2P = O , and 3P in this case, is 2P+P = O+P = P.
Explicit Formulas for Prime Curves
For elliptic curves over Fp, consider two points P = (x1,y1) and Q = (x2,y2), P 6=
±Q, the point P+Q = (x3,y3) is given by:
λ =
y2− y1
x2− x1
x3 = λ 2− x1− x2
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Figure 4.3: Elliptic curve point doubling [136]
y3 = λ (x1− x3)− y1
When P = −Q, P+Q equals point at infinity O . When P = Q, we apply the
doubling formula:
λ =
3x21+a
2y1
x3 = λ 2−2x1
y3 = λ (x1− x3)− y1
Scalar Multiplication
Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fp, if P ∈ E is a point of order r,
the cyclic subgroup of E generated by P is O,P,2P, . . . ,(r−1)P. Then if we define
the scalar k as an integer within the range [1,r− 1], we can multiply a point by
the scalar k and we obtain: Q = kP, where Q is also a point which belongs to the
subgroup generated by P.
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4.4 ECDLP
The hardness of cryptosystem using elliptic curve point multiplication is based on
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, which is an adaptation of traditional
discrete logarithm problem to elliptic curves.
Definition 10. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): Given an el-
liptic curve E defined over a finite field and two points P,Q ∈ E, find an integer k
such that Q = kP if such k exists.
The ECDLP is believed to be harder to solve than other recognized problems
such as integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative
group of a finite field, which are the foundations of RSA [139] and the ElGamal
[84] cryptosystems. “Harder to solve” implies shorter keys are needed to provide
the same level of security as recommended by [13]. Table 4.1 shows the key size
comparison for elliptic curves and RSA.
Table 4.1: NIST’s recommendation for practical applications revision 4 [130]
Security level in bits Block cipher Fp Fm2 RSA
80 SKIPJACK 192 163 1024
112 Triple-DES 224 233 2048
128 AES Small 256 283 3072
192 AES Medium 384 409 7680
256 AES Large 521 571 15360
REMARK: In Jan 2016, NSA has updated this table. Key changes are [130]:
security level less than 112 (shaded in red) are no longer approved for applying
cryptographic protection on Federal government information. Algorithms (shaded
in yellow) are not included in the NIST standards for interoperability and efficiency
reasons. At the same time NSA announced changes from Suite B cryptography to
the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite which no longer recommends
algorithms shaded in orange for national security systems [129].
Common methods for solving ECDLP are Pollards rho algorithm and index-
calculus method. We refer reader to [100, 132] for more details.
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4.5 An Interesting Research Question - Semaev Ci-
pher
When we cryptanalyse a block cipher, we write algebraic equations. Is it possible to
also describe ECDLP and other EC cryptography problems by simple polynomial
equations mod p?
4.5.1 Summation Polynomials
Let E be a general elliptic curve over field F in Weierstrass form given by the Equa-
tion 4.1 we define
S2 (X1,X2) = X1−X2 ∈ F [X1,X2]
The third summation polynomial to be the polynomial S3 (X1,X2,X3)∈F [X1,X2,X3]
of degree 4 by [118]:
S3 (X1,X2,X3) =
(
X21 X
2
2 +X
2
1 X
2
3 +X
2
2 X
2
3
)−2(X21 X2X3+X1X22 X3+X1X2X23 )
−d2 (X1X2X3)−d4 (X1X2+X1X3+X2X3)−d6 (X1+X2+X3)−d8 (4.4)
then for m≥ 4 in any case:
Sm(X1, . . . ,Xm) = ResX (Sm−r (X1, . . . ,Xm−r−1,X) ,Sr+2(Xm−r (Xm−r, . . . ,Xm,X))
where 1≤ r ≤ m−3.
Summation Polynomials were first introduced by Semaev in 2004 [145]. Se-
maev’s summation polynomials have the property that if Sm(a1, . . . ,am) = 0 for
some field elements a1, . . . ,am ∈ F if and only if there are elliptic curve points
(a1,b1) , . . . ,(am,bm) on E such that (a1,b1)+ · · ·+(am,bm) = 0. The idea is to rep-
resent point addition in elliptic curves using a multivariate equation system and try
to solve the equation system. This topic has been studied by a lot of researchers try-
ing to solve the ECDLP problem [81, 95, 89, 90, 133, 104]. In 2015 a new method
was introduced by Semaev [147] and the idea is trying to solve the equation sys-
tem by introducing new variables that lower the degree of the system of equations.
In this section we will look at Semaev’s summation polynomials S3 (X1,X2,X3) for
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curves over Fp and Fm2 , then introduce some open research questions.
Elliptic Curves Over Fp
For an elliptic curve over a field K of characteristic > 3 we recall the curve equation
4.2 y3 = x3+a4x+a6 and S3 (X1,X2,X3) equation can be simplified to: [118]
S3(X1,X2,X3) = (X21 X
2
2 +X
2
1 X
2
3 +X
2
2 X
2
3 )−2(X21 X2X3+X1X22 X3+X1X2X23 )
−2a4(X1X2+X1X3+X2X3)−4a6(X1+X2+X3)+a24
= (X1−X2)2X23 −2((X1X2+a4)(X1+X2)+2a6)X3+(X1X2−a4)2
−4a6(X1+X2)
(4.5)
and it is also easy to get for point doubling when X1 = X2 we have
−2(X31 +2a4X1+2a6)X3+ (X21 −a4)2−8a6X1 = 0 (4.6)
Special Curve secp256k1
For curve secp256k1 4 where a4 = 0 and a6 = 7, equation 4.5 and equation 4.6 can
be written as the following:
S3(X1,X2,X3) = (X1−X2)2X23 −2((X1X2)(X1+X2)+14)X3+X21 X22
−28(X1+X2)
(4.7)
and for point doubling when X1 = X2
−2(X31 +14)X3+X41 −56X1 = 0
X3 =
X41 −56X1
2X31 +28
Elliptic Curves Over F2m
For an elliptic curve over a Fm2 , we have curve equation y2+xy= x3+a2x2+a6 We
4Elliptic curve used in bitcoin; we will give more details in Section 4.8
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have d2 = 1, d4 = 0, d6 = 0 and d8 = a6 (see Section 4.2). In binary field anything
multiply by 2 equal to 0, A−B = A+B, thus equation 4.4 can be simplified to:
S3(X1,X2,X3) = (X21 X
2
2 +X
2
1 X
2
3 +X
2
2 X
2
3 )−X1X2X3−a6
= (X1X2+X1X3+X2X3)
2+X1X2X3+a6
and when X1 = X2 we have:
X41 +X
2
1 X3+a6 = 0
X3 = X21 +
a6
X21
Research question: What is the hardness of solving summation polynomials?
4.5.2 Solving Semaev Equations with Extra Variables
In Section 4.5.1 we explained the Semaev polynomials which have equations in
very large degree. An interesting idea which is also used in algebraic cryptanalysis
is to reduce the degree by adding new variables. In Semaev’s recent paper [147] he
introduced a new algorithm trying to solving ECDLP using summation polynomials
for curves over F2m . By recursively computing summation polynomials, instead of
trying to write R= P1+ · · ·+Pm for point Pi, we can write Q1 = P1+P2,Q2 =Q1+
P3, . . . ,R = Qm−2 +Pm, where the Qi are completely arbitrary points (see equation
4.8). Then solve the multivariate equation system under some assumptions.

S3(Q1,P1,P2) = 0
S3(Q1,Q2,P3) = 0
S3(Q2,Q3,P4) = 0
...
S3(Qi,Qi+1,Pi+2) = 0
...
S3(Qm−2,Pm,R) = 0.
(4.8)
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From this one can hope to do point splitting and index-calculus. We refer reader
to [64, 132] to see how ECDLP might be solved if one can solve such equation
efficiently.
However the final result of Semaev’s new work is still uncertain. Some re-
searchers believes the complexity analysis in Semaev’s paper are not quite correct,
cf. later work by Kosters and Yeo [118] and blog posts [94, 45]. This leads to some
open research questions.
Semaev Cipher
The new equation system introduced in Semaev’s new paper has clear block cipher
topology (see Figure 3.2 in Section 3.5) [75]. It is very similar to the block cipher
equations we have tried to solve for GOST and SIMON [69, 55]. It is potentially
able to be solved by methods used in algebraic cryptanalysis [75]. We call Semaev’s
new summation polynomial equations Semaev cipher.
4.6 Elliptic Curve in Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was independently proposed by Neal
Koblitz[117] and Victor Miller [125] in 1985. It is a public-key cryptography
protocol where each of the participant has a pair of keys. One private key which
is kept as a secret by the owner and one public key which is public potentially for
everyone. In the past 10+ years ECC has been increasingly used in practice since
its inclusion in standards by organisations such as ISO, IEEE, NIST,etc. Elliptic
curves are more efficient [17] and offer smaller key sizes [119] at the same security
as other widely adopted public key cryptography schemes such as RSA [139].
There are many widely used elliptic curve cryptographic schemes such as El-
liptic Curve DiffieHellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme based on the DiffieHell-
man scheme, Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES), and Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) etc. In this thesis we only focus on
ECDSA [107] (key generation part in particular) which is used in Bitcoin and we
refer the readers to [100] for details of other schemes.
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4.6.1 Domain Parameters
Elliptic curve cryptographic schemes need to agree on a fixed elliptic curve and a
finite field. The fixed elliptic curves are normally chosen from curves which are
suggested by standard organisations, such as ISO, IEEE etc. Domain parameters
for an elliptic curve scheme describe an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field
Fp, a base point G ∈ E (Fp), and its order n. The parameters should be chosen so
that the ECDLP is resistant to all known attacks. Domain parameters are defined as
the following D = (p,FR,S,a,b,G,n,h) where
1. p is the field order
2. FR (field representation) is an indication of the representation used for the elements
of Fp
3. If the curve is deterministically generated, S is the seed used to generated the curve
4. a,b ∈ Fp that define the curve equation over field Fp
5. G is the base point where G = (Gx,Gy) ∈ E(Fp)
6. The order n of G
7. The cofactor h = #E(Fp)n
An example can be found in Section 4.8.
4.6.2 Key Pair Generation
An elliptic curve key pair is defined for a particular set of valid domain parame-
ters (cf. [100] page 180 for generating and verify EC domain parameters). The
public key is a random generated point Q in the group 〈G〉 generated by G. The
corresponding private key is d = logG Q. The key pair generation algorithm is the
following:
Algorithm 2 Key pair generation [100] page 180
Input: Domain parameters D = (p,FR,S,a,b,G,n,h)
Output: Public key Q, private key d
1: Select d ∈R [1,n−1].
2: Compute Q = dG.
3: Return (Q,d).
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Note that the process of computing a private key d given public key Q is exactly
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Hence it is very import to chose a set
of domain parameters so that the ECDLP is hard to solve. In addition the number
d should be random in the sense that the probability of any particular value being
selected must be sufficiently small to prevent an adversary from gaining advantage
through optimizing a search strategy based on such a probability.
Not all the key pairs are valid keys. A public key Q = (Qx,Qy) is valid if it
satisfies all the following requirements:
1. Q 6= O ( O is the point at infinity).
2. Qx and Qy are properly represented elements of Fp (i.e., integers in [0, p−1]
for prime field and bit strings of length m for binary field Fm2 ).
3. Q satisfies the elliptic curve equation defined by a and b.
4. we can also verify that nQ =O .
4.6.3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a cryptographic scheme
based on elliptic curve cryptography that authenticates a message (and a signer),
and checks that the content of the message is authentic and comes from the signer.
ECDSA is the most widely standardised elliptic curve based signature scheme, ap-
pearing in the FIPS 186-2[92], IEEE 1363-2000 [98], ANSI X9.62 [6] etc. Typi-
cally, ECDSA consists of three parts: key generation, signing and verification. We
have discussed the key generation part in the previous section, see Algorithm 2.
Now we look at signature and verification algorithms.
Let m be the message that the sender want to send, the message sender obtained
his EC key pair d and Q using the key generation algorithm using an elliptic curve
defined by a set of domain parameters D = (p,FR,S,a,b,G,n,h). The process for
signature generation is described in Algorithm 3. In the following algorithms, H
denotes a cryptographic hash function whose outputs size is at least n (if longer
than n, H can be truncated).
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Algorithm 3 ECDSA signature generation [100] page 184
Input: Domain parameters D = (p,FR,S,a,b,G,n,h), private key d, message m
Output: Signature (r,s)
1: Select k ∈R [1,n−1].
2: Compute kG = (x1,y1) and convert x1 to an integer x¯1.
3: Compute r = x¯1 mod n. If r = 0 then go to step 1.
4: Compute e = H(m).
5: Compute s = k−1(e+dr) mod n. If s = 0 then go to step 1.
6: Return (r,s).
Anyone can verify the sender signature by using the sender’s public key and
the verification process is described as follows:
Algorithm 4 ECDSA signature verification [100] page 184
Input: Domain parameters D = (p,FR,S,a,b,G,n,h), public key Q, message m,
signature (r,s)
Output: Acceptance or rejection of the signature
1: Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1,n−1]. If any verification fails,
reject the signature
2: Compute e = H(m).
3: Compute w = s−1 mod n.
4: Compute u1 = ew mod n and u2 = rw mod n.
5: Compute X = u1G+u2Q.
6: If X is point at infinity O then reject the signature
7: Convert the x-coordinate x1 of X to an integer x¯1; compute v = x¯1 mod n.
8: If v = r then accept the signature otherwise reject the signature.
4.7 Bitcoin and Brain Wallet Attacks
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, an electronic payment system based on cryptography.
It was created by Satoshi Nakomoto5 in 2008 [128]. In 2009, Bitcoin was launched
as open-source software. Bitcoin is designed to be a fully decentralised peer-to-
peer network — self-governing without support from trusted entities such as banks
or governments. Bitcoin transactions are like cheques but signed cryptographically
instead of using ink. Transactions are broadcast to the peer-to-peer network and
verified by each node. A public ledger called a ”blockchain” records transactions
pseudonymously.
5It is not known whether Satoshi Nakomoto is a real or pseudonym name or if it represents one
person or a group
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Creation of new bitcoins6 is through a process called mining and participants
are called miners. Miners offer their computation power to solve a hard mathemat-
ics problem, and winners will be rewarded the newly created bitcoin. The chance
of winning a reward is directly proportional to the miner’s computing power. Dur-
ing the process of mining, transactions have been processed and recorded into the
blockchain.
Ownership of bitcoins implies that a user can spend bitcoins associated with a
specific address (equivalent to a bank account). In order to spend the coins, a payer
must digitally sign a transaction using their private key. The signed transaction is
then broadcast to the peer-to-peer network. Everyone on the network can verify
the signature that has been sent out. Anyone can spend all the bitcoin in a bitcoin
address as long as they hold the corresponding private key. Once the private key is
lost, the Bitcoin network will not recognize any other evidence of ownership.
Bitcoin uses digital signature to protect the ownership. Thus it is very impor-
tant to look at the technical details of the digital signature scheme used in Bitcoin.
The popularity of Bitcoin, especially with large populations who had not previously
used cryptographic software, has meant that lots of users have attempted to manage
private keys for the first time in the context of Bitcoin. In the next section, we study
the Bitcoin brain wallet, our main attack target in this part of my research work.
We will discuss the technical details of how Bitcoin addresses are generated, using
which elliptic curve, and how the curve is defined.
4.8 Bitcoin Elliptic Curve
Bitcoin uses Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA, see Section
4.6.3). The elliptic curve used in Bitcoin is called secp256k1. In the FIPS 186-
2 standard [92] NIST recommends five elliptic curves for use in ECDSA, targeting
five different security levels (192,224,256,384,521). In this standard, these curves
are named as P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 7. The Bitcoin elliptic curve is
proposed in Certicom [33] in addition to NIST curve for 256 bits prime. Secp256k1
6Following convention, lowercase “bitcoin” refers to a unit of currency within the uppercase
Bitcoin system.
7In practice these also appear as nistp192, nistp224 etc; in Certicom recommended curves they
are named as secp***r1, and in OpenSSL they are called prime***v1
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is defined over prime field Fp where the domain parameters (p,a,b,G,n,h) are de-
fined as following:
p=FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFC2F
= 2256−232−29−28−27−26−24−1
The curve equation E is y2 = x3 + ax+ b where a = 0 and b = 7. The base point
G : (Gx,Gy) is defined as:
Gx = 79BE667E F9DCBBAC 55A06295 CE870B07 029BFCDB 2DCE28D9 59F2815B 16F81798
Gy = 483ADA77 26A3C465 5DA4FBFC 0E1108A8 FD17B448 A6855419 9C47D08F FB10D4B8
the cofactor h = 1, the order n of G are:
n=FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C D0364141
4.9 Brain Wallets
A Bitcoin wallet is a collection of Bitcoin addresses and stores the corresponding
keys for those addresses. Bitcoin wallets come in different forms, including desktop
software, mobile apps, online services, hardware, smart card and paper.
As we discussed earlier in Section 4.6.2, the private key is a number which we
presume to be totally random. Normally the private key will be a long hex string
which is very hard for a person to remember and store safely. No matter what form
of wallet we are using, there always exists a chance that someone might lose his
wallet in a cybersecurity breach.
Brain wallets are another solution, which do not need the users to keep any-
thing in a safe and still be able to recover their private key. Instead of storing a
private key and protecting it, one can store it in a human mind. A brain wallet cre-
ates a private key from a (typically) human chosen password or a passphrase, and
using the SHA-256 hash algorithm to turn it into a 256-bit number. As SHA-256
is a deterministic method, users can always use the same password to recreate their
private key. Note that since brain wallets use the hash directly as the private key,
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the security of storing private keys now depends only on how unpredictable the
passwords are.
Here we give an example show how Bitcoin brain wallet can be generated by
using password “password”:
1. Private key: SHA256(“password”)
5E884898DA28047151D0E56F8DC6292773603D0D6AABBDD62A11EF721D1542D8
2. Public key (uncompressed) : Elliptic curve secp256k1 key pair generation
04B568858A407A8721923B89DF9963D30013639AC690CCE5F555529B77B83CBFC7
6950F90BE717E38A3ECE1F5558F40179F8C9502DECA11183BB3A3AEA797736A6
3. SHA256 (Public key)
1D8ED6551EE910136EB0EA735106E137565E8F5EBF8DF73A6A877C92C049F922
4. Hash160 : RIPEMD160
3E546D0ACC0DE5AA3D66D7A920900ECBC66C2031
(used for transaction)
Figure 4.4: Brainwallet generated by password “password”
Brain wallet users are normally urged to use strong passwords or passphrases.
Websites provide a brain wallets generation service often using Figure 4.5 to tell
the users what is a strong password. However, this figure is a little bit misleading
which makes users feel it is safe to use brain wallets with a passphrase. We have
actually cracked quite a few such passphrases. In this thesis we mainly focus on
speed optimization of password guessing.
In the next section we will discuss about existing methods of Bitcoin elliptic
curve implementation, benchmarking the state-of-art attack and show an improved
method of running the attack with much faster speed on a laptop.
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Figure 4.5: Password strength comparison between using password and passphrase, source:
xkcd.com. This cartoon gives us good advice about how hard it is to guess
one user’s passwords. But sometimes the speed of guessing can be misleading.
4.9.1 Related Work
We are not the first ones try to crack Bitcoin brain wallets; a lot of other security
researchers are doing it. Many victims have found their money stolen and posted it
in forums. The first ethical/research brain wallet cracker was announced publicly in
a recent hacking conference DEF CON 23 (Aug 2015). Ryan Castellucci, a whitehat
hacker, presented his research on cracking brain wallets, and also published his
software [31]. Ryan’s attack was done on an Intel i7 PC with 4 hyper-threaded
cores. The attack speed can reach approximately 16,250 passwords per second on
each thread and he had cracked more than 18,000 brain wallet addresses.
The software Ryan has published uses an existing open source secp256k1 Bit-
coin elliptic curve implementation mainly written by Pieter Wuille, one of Bitcoin
core developers. This implementation is widely used in Bitcoin clients and is con-
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sidered the current best in terms of code level optimization (detailed benchmarks
are given in table 8.2).
Later Vasek et al. published their cybercrime analysis results on brain wallets
addresses cracked using Ryan’s software implementation in FC 2016. Their work
was more focused on brain wallets usage measurements and did not try to improve
the speed of the attack.
4.10 Summary
In this chapter we introduced elliptic curve and elliptic curve cryptography. We
discussed Bitcoin, one of the largest application of ECC. In particular we reviewed
Bitcoin brain wallets. We explained how to generate a brain wallet from a user
selected password in detail and reviewed current attack on brain wallets. In Part III
we will provide benchmarks for each operations in Bitcoin key generation process
and propose an improved attack on brain wallets.
Part II
The Path to Better Software
Algebraic Cryptanalysis
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Chapter 5
Contradiction Immunity and
Application to GOST
In this chapter, we will introduce a key fundamental notion of Contradiction Im-
munity of a block cipher and a related notion of SAT Immunity. These notions
lead to new computational optimization problems in cryptography. The main idea
is to look for an optimal software guess-then-determine attack. We also provide a
concrete example of how this attack can be accomplished on the Russian federation
encryption standard GOST with a SAT solver.
5.1 Contradiction Immunity and SAT Immunity
5.1.1 Software Algebraic Attack with SAT Solver
As we discussed in Section 3.6.2, due to the self similarity property inside the cipher
structure, the problem of solving full GOST can be reduced to solving an 8 rounds
GOST [44]. In Section 3.5.2 we described algebraic complexity reduction and the
notion of amplification in general. In this section we look at how the amplification
principle can be applied to GOST. Here the question is what is the best possible
software attack with tools such as the ElimLin algorithm [68, 48, 58], SAT solvers
[50, 9], Gro¨bner bases [88] and others [146]. In all these algorithms we observe
the phenomenon of amplification in various forms. For example, we can study and
count linearly independent linear equations and try to amplify their number by the
ElimLin algorithm [68, 48, 58]. When the ElimLin algorithm is itself the last step
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of the attack, or if the SAT solver is the last step of the attack, this amplification
phenomenon becomes very important. We observe an avalanche-like phenomenon
where more and more new linear equations are generated in the ElimLin algorithm,
until the system is solved. Similarly, with a SAT solver there is a point of phase
transition where the problem becomes really easy to solve. If we want to under-
stand algebraic cryptanalysis, we need precisely to work on this phase transition
phenomenon itself. What happens after this threshold, when the problem is just
very easy to solve, is less important.
In this chapter we focus more specifically on cryptographic attacks with SAT
solvers, and on GOST, which is a nice example of a weak government standard
cipher with excessively poor diffusion. There are two main approaches in SAT
cryptanalysis or two main ways to break a cipher with a SAT solver:
1. The SAT Method: Guess X bits and run a SAT solver which, if the assump-
tion on X bits is correct, takes time T . Abort all the other computations at
time T . The total time complexity is about 2X ·T .
2. The UNSAT Method: Guess X bits and run a SAT solver which, if the as-
sumption on X bits is incorrect, finds a contradiction in time T with large
probability 1−P say 99%.
With a small probability of P > 0, we can guess more key bits and either find
additional contradictions or find the solution.
The idea is that if P is small enough, the complexity of these additional steps
can be less then the 2X ·T spent in the initial UNSAT step.
3. A Mixed UNSAT/SAT Attack: In practice maybe P is not as small as we
wish, and therefore we may have a mix of SAT and UNSAT methods: where
the final complexity will be a sum of two (or more) terms, none of which can
be neglected. We will see a very nice example of how a combined attack can
be better than any of SAT and UNSAT methods in isolation in Section 5.2.4.
Note that the UNSAT method does not belong to amplification, but it reduces
solving complexity by quickly rejecting wrong guesses. This can be seen as cutting
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the branches in a binary search tree, and finally makes finding contradictions easier
by a SAT solver. The idea behind the UNSAT method also appears in Cryptanalysis
history. For example, Turing’s Bombe machine which explored the daily setting of
the Germany Enigma, used a similar idea by rejecting wrong guesses which lead to
a contradiction (to be precise, one letter is encrypted to itself).
5.1.2 Contradiction Immunity and SAT Immunity
In order to quantify the resistance of a cipher against the two attacks described
above, it is natural to define the two following numbers:
Definition 11 (Contradiction Immunity or UNSAT Immunity). We define the Con-
tradiction Immunity of a given cipher and for M = 1 plaintext/ciphertext pairs of
the cipher as being the smallest possible number of key bits which can be fixed so
that given M = 1 P/C pair we can obtain a contradiction with probability at least
50% by just examining the logical consequences of these key bits. We require this
contradiction to be found in a very short time, less than 1 second for the best SAT
solver available.
Definition 12. [SAT Immunity or Satisfaction Immunity] We define the SAT Immu-
nity of a given cipher and for M plaintext/ciphertext pairs of the cipher as being the
smallest possible number of key bits which can be fixed so that given M P/C pairs
we can compute the secret key by the best available SAT solver in a relatively short
time, say less than 1000 seconds.
These notions are as precise as they can be. Although they depend on the
software used, but it is not to excessive extent. Because we can only hope to provide
upper bounds for this quantity by concrete attacks with concrete software, it makes
sense to use the best available software and improve these bounds slightly each
time as the software improves. Importantly, we should consider that the first notion
is much more robust and more fundamental: it expected to depend only on the
connections between the components with the “optimal” subset of key bits, we do
not expect that the contradiction will be found by examining too many other bits,
but just by simple step-by-step local analysis. We also expect that the time taken
5.1. Contradiction Immunity and SAT Immunity 85
to find a contradiction will be essentially zero and will not depend too much on
the software used. Some SAT solvers are good at solving contradiction problems
(known as UNSAT problems), but in this case, we believe it is not very important
which SAT solver will be used to obtain the contradiction. In contrast, the SAT
Immunity can only be determined by somewhat “solving” the whole cipher, with
the avalanche effect. Unless we are able to determine all the bits in the whole
cipher, we do NOT know if the cipher is really solvable. Our experience shows
that the results for the second notion will depend a lot on the SAT solver software
used and where some software works well, some other does not seem to work at
all 1. This is because when solving UNSAT problems (espically in crypanalysis) a
contridiction can be easily found in early round of the encryption, thus the solving
complexity is very low and problem normally get solved within seconds. Even
different algorthims perform differently on a given problem, in most of the case, the
difference is very small in order to find a contridiction. However when solving a
SAT problem the aim is to solve the whole equeation system with and find the key,
(in Definition 12, we set solver time out as 1000 seconds). Due to the complexity
of the problem, some SAT solvers can’t find any solution within the time limit.
A small technicality is that in order to determine the key uniquely in many
ciphers where the key size is bigger than the block size, it is necessary to use some
M > 1. Because in order to find a unique solution within a multivariable equations
system, the number of equations should be larger than the number of unknowns,
otherwise there could exist multiple solutions in the equation system. However,
for the first notion, for finding contradictions, we can frequently limit ourselves to
considering the case where M = 1 because most of the case contridiction can be
found easily within early round of the encryption if key bits are wrong.
5.1.3 Applications of UNSAT/SAT Immunities
Cryptanalysis. SAT and UNSAT immunities will allow us to evaluate the security
of the cipher against cryptanalytic attacks with a SAT solver. Upper bounds we
1Performance of a SAT solver solving cryptanalysis problems is largerly depends on how the
cipher is represented using CNF format. The number of variables and constrains in a SAT problem
can dertimin the solving complexity and each solver perfroms differently on different problem.
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obtain do translate, more or less, as we will see, into concrete attacks with a com-
plexity of about 2X . The two figures will also indicate which of the three strategies
(SAT/UNSAT/Mixed) is more likely to work.
Design of Block Ciphers. It is easy to see that the designer of a cipher can very
effectively lower-bound these quantities. This will be achieved by making sure that
each S-box in each round influences as many S-boxes as possible in the next round.
This is not all very different to designing a cipher which is provably resistant to
linear and differential cryptanalysis. In 2007, Schneier once claimed that “Against
differential and linear cryptanalysis, GOST is probably stronger than DES” [142].
Therefore we should also expect that Contradiction Immunity of DES and GOST
are comparable. Happily, similar attacks with SAT solvers have been developed for
both DES [48] and GOST [50]. In fact, it is obvious that the diffusion in DES is
much better than in GOST and so is the Contradiction Immunity in DES. However,
we need to be careful about drawing any conclusions and direct comparisons do
not mean much. If the contradiction immunity is 78 for 8 out of 32 rounds of
GOST with 3 P/C pairs and 256-bit keys, is it better or less good than contradiction
immunity being 20 for 6 rounds out of 16 of DES with 1 P/C pair and 56-bit keys?
It is very hard to say.
5.2 Applying SAT/UNSAT Immunity to GOST and
DES
5.2.1 Application to DES
In DES the key bits are spread more or less uniformly in different rounds, and they
tend to repeat many times. Therefore it is difficult to choose really good sets of
bits using our discovery method and, for now, we just report upper bounds obtained
when choosing the key bits at random, and letting the SAT solver do the job.
There are multiple ways of write DES S-boxes into algebric equations which
will leads to different solving complexity for AC solving stages. In 2007 Courtois
and Bard studied the best s-box encodings with low I/O degrees [65], and pro-
vided ready software for generating such equations and solve the SAT problem
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using MiniSat [156]. Our experiments set up uses the same software for generating
DES equations, and the results are obtained by using a better performing SAT solver
CryptoMiniSat 2.92 [157].
For Contradiction Immunity our experiments use 8 rounds of DES with 1 P/C
pair. Using random generated key and fix a large number of the key bits x, then
reduce x until we no longer able to obtain a contradiction with probability at 50%
using SAT solver within 1 seconds. Finally, report the smallest possible number of
key bits. For SAT immunity, the experiment was using 8 rounds of DES and 1 P/C
pair, random key and random fixed key bits. We run CryptoMiniSat until we obtian
the smallest possible number of key bits that can be fixed so that we can solve the
converted SAT problem and obtain the secret key within 1000 seconds.
Our final results are:
1. The Contradiction Immunity is at most 44 for 8 rounds of DES.
2. The SAT Immunity is at most 34 for 8 rounds of DES and 1 P/C pair.
DES has key size of 56 bits, for SAT method, we have to fix 34 bits (request
234 GOST encryption) and solve within 1000 seconds by a SAT solver. Our PC
can run approximately 222 8 rounds DES encryptions per seconds. The total time
complexity of solving 8 rounds of DES using 1 P/C pair is larger than brute force.
For ultra low-data complexity attacks, 8 rounds of DES seem already secure or
secure enough.
5.2.2 Contradiction Immunity of GOST
Now we are going to provide some results on the Contradiction Immunity and SAT
Immunity of GOST. These results are constructive upper bounds.
First we started in a similar set up as DES, with random selected key bits for
guessing. The initail Contradiction Immunity we got was about 128. Previous
cryptanalysis work on GOST done by Coutrios in 2012 [61] analysed the internal
structure on GOST and how key bits and S-boxes are connected for each round of
the encryption. Courtios’ work [61] shows that GOST splits very neatly into two
nearly independent ciphers with 128-bit key each, which are only loosely connected.
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With this idea it is easy to understand why Courtois’ original attack on 8 rounds of
GOST with complexity of 2120 [62] seems plausible and natural. Randonly guessed
key bits will not create a closely connected structure, thus the chance to find a
contridiction for wrong guesses become harder compared to closely connected key
bits. However, our research found that it is much lower than 128, and much closer
to 64.
Proposition 1. The Contradiction Immunity for 8 rounds of GOST is at most 78.
Notation, cf. Figure 5.1: We denote by S13 just 1 higher ranking bit at S-box
1 in a given round. Similarly we denote by S33 the 3 lower ranking bits of S3.
Figure 5.1: Our best set of 78 bits for UNSAT. We denote by S13 just 1 higher ranking bit
at S-box 1 in a given round. Similarly S33 the 3 lower ranking bits of S3.  is
the modulo 232 operation. Best set we found is fixing key bits 0-15,47-58,64-
70,111-114,128-130,175-182,192-202,239-255. The inner rounds output bits
that are determined by these key bits are showed in the figure
We have constructed and tried many different sets aiming at a contradiction
in the middle. Such sets can be constructed using simple heuristic method such as
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hill-climbing method [144] with a staring point contructed by humman. Our best
set is as follows (cf. Figure 5.1): 0-15,47-58,64-70,111-114,128-130,175-182,192-
202,239-255. The contradictions can be found in time of 0.06 s with CryptoMiniSat
2.92 software [157] with a probability of about 50 %.
5.2.3 SAT Immunity of GOST
It turns out that a set which is good for UNSAT is typically NOT good at SAT. No
SAT solver software we dispose of is able to find the missing bits if the 78 bits of
Figure 5.1 are fixed. Happily we have found sets which are very good at SAT and
they are in fact smaller than 78. Our best result is as follows:
Proposition 2. The SAT Immunity for 8 rounds of GOST and 4 P/C pair is at most
68.
We use the following set of bits depicted on Fig 5.2 0-15,51-55,64-66,128-
130,179-183,192-207,224-231,244-255. All the remaining 256-68 bits can be de-
termined in time of about 400 seconds using GOST encodings described in Section
3.6.3 and with CryptoMiniSat 2.92.
From here a naive “SAT strategy” attack on GOST would be to run a SAT
solver for 400 seconds 268 times. This would be about 299 GOST encryptions.
5.2.4 Low Data Complexity Meet-In-The-Middle Attack for 8
Rounds GOST
In our attack with 4 P/C pairs we want to find a contradiction for all the 4 pairs
simultaneously. This will be easier than contradiction with 1 P/C pairs we studied
previously. This leads to the following improved attack which mixes the SAT and
UNSAT strategies.
1. We use our set of 68 bits as on Figure 5.2.
2. We run the software 268 times for all possible assignments of the 68 bits.
3. Computer simulations with the timeout of 7 seconds, a proportion of 1−2−5
of cases on 68 bits terminates with UNSAT within 2 s on average.
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Figure 5.2: Our best set of 68 bits for SAT
4. Overall, we only need to run a proportion of 2−5 of all the 268 cases for as
many as 400 seconds; in other cases it simply terminates automatically within
2 s which is 223 GOST encryptions on the same CPU.
5. Assuming that all the other cases run for 400 s (some still terminate earlier)
our conservative estimate of the attack time is 268+23+268+31−5≈ 294 GOST
computations.
5.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed algebraic cryptanalysis using SAT solver as solving
stage and it’s application to break 8 round GOST. We introduced a new notion of
Contradiction Immunity and a related notion of SAT Immunity. These definitions
lead to new computational optimization problems in cryptography, which can be
seen as looking for an optimal software guess-then-solve attack. We provided our
best optimizations found which were constructed following a sort of meet-in-the
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middle strategy. Our key result is that the Contradiction Immunity for the GOST
cipher is quite low, about 78, for 8 rounds.
The main contribution of this chpater is not just providing a bound on the two
Immunity figures, but to provide concrete sets of bits based on which we can build
concrete attacks on the given cipher. Theses sets are fundamental in being able to
improve the time complexity of 8 rounds of GOST attack from 2120 to 294.
Chapter 6
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Simon
In Chapter 5 we have introduced the notion of contradiction immunity and SAT
immunity. We have shown how an optimized guess-then-solve attack can be done
on GOST. In this chapter, we are going to explore how to improve algebraic attack
with well chosen data. Our target is the new NSA block cipher Simon [14]. The
lightweight block cipher Simon was introduced by NSA in 2013 and later submitted
to ISO to become an international standard. Similar to GOST, Simon has very
low diffusion and small S-boxes, which makes it an excellent target for algebraic
cryptanalysis. Our aim is to use the very rich algebraic structure with additional
data provided ( e.g. pairs {(P,P′),(C,C′)} which follow a certain highly probable
truncated differential property) in order to solve the underlying multivariate system
of equations. We attempt to solve the system by either using a SAT solver (after
converting the system to its corresponding CNF-SAT form with the Courtois-Bard-
Jefferson method [9]) or by the ElimLin algorithm [22, 50, 53]. We are able to
break up to 10 (/44) rounds of the cipher using a SAT solver and the usual guess-
then-determine techniques. Surprisingly, in most cases we are able to obtain the
key without guessing any key bits when truncated differentials are used. This is a
very remarkable result as it gives a good hope that the attack will scale up well for
a larger number of rounds. This is possibly due to the very low non-linearity of the
cipher and suggests that it is worth studying a specific strategy for P/C pairs which
have a certain structure and decrease even more the non-linearity of the system by
introducing more linear equations (e.g. truncated differential properties) until the
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key can be obtained even for a larger number of rounds. We will discuss in details
our results in Section 6.3.
6.1 How to Write Simon Equations
In Figure 3.1 we showed a general example of modelling a block cipher into MQ
equation systems. Here we give a concrete example for writing Simon64/128 in a
single round.
Recall the Simon structure in Figure 3.5, let eki be the i-th key bit used in Nr-
th round of Simon64/128 encryption. The 32-bit key has a binary representation:
ek = (ek31,ek30...ek0). Let ZRNri and ZL
Nr
i be the i-th bit of Nr-th round right and
left side input, and similarly ZRNr+1i , ZL
Nr+1
i for the i-th bit of output. Then we
have:
ek0+ZLNr30 +ZR
Nr
0 +ZL
Nr+1
0 +ZL
Nr
24 ∗ZLNr31 = 0
ZRNr+10 +ZL
Nr
0 = 0
ek1+ZLNr31 +ZR
Nr
1 +ZL
Nr+1
1 +ZL
Nr
25 ∗ZLNr0 = 0
ZRNr+11 +ZL
Nr
1 = 0
. . .
ek31+ZLNr29 +ZR
Nr
31 +ZL
Nr+1
31 +ZL
Nr
23 ∗ZLNr30 = 0
ZRNr+131 +ZL
Nr
31 = 0
Similarly, one can simply write equations for the key extension function, cf.
[14]. More details can be found in our Simon implementation code (including equa-
tion generator for all versions) which is available online [154].
6.2 Differential-Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Simon
We evaluated the security of Simon against algebraic attacks under the following
three settings (cf. Fig. 6.1), where S=Similar and R=Random as explained in the
introduction.
• Setting 1: Known Plaintext Attack. Random P/C pairs are available (RP/RC).
• Setting 2: One type of Chosen Plaintext Attack. Random P/C pairs are avail-
able with plaintexts of low Hamming distance (SP/RC).
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• Setting 3: Some form of Chosen Plaintext and Ciphertext Attack. Random
P/C pairs which satisfy a truncated differential property in the input and out-
put of the reduced-version of the cipher we study. (SP/SC)
Figure 6.1: Our three attack scenarios
Setting 1 is the simplest setting for understanding how many rounds of Simon
can be broken by simple techniques, assuming availability of a few P/C pairs. This
setting helps us to understand the maximum number of rounds we can break by
guessing as few key bits as possible and using as few P/C pairs as possible. It is a
non-trivial step in order to set the benchmark for attacking larger number of rounds.
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Setting 2 is a form of known-plaintext attack. Setting 2 requires the existence
of P/C pairs with plaintexts of low Hamming distance (or similar plaintexts) such
that many variables are eliminated in the first few rounds due to weak diffusion.
By eliminating some variables from the initial equations we expect that the system
will be solved faster using any solving technique. This is a form of chosen plaintext
attack.
Lastly, Setting 3 assumes the existence of P/C pairs
{(P1,C1),(P2,C2), ...,(Pn,Cn)}
such that Pi⊕Pj ∈ ∆P and Ci⊕C j ∈ ∆C, for all 1≤ i, j≤ n and some truncated
differential masks ∆P,∆C of low Hamming weight which holds with comparatively
high probability. In our attacks we always use 2 pairs which satisfy a given trun-
cated differential property and then more P/C pairs are generated by using the first 2
plaintexts and computing the encryptions of new plaintexts which have small Ham-
ming distance from the first ones.
The difference from Setting 2 is that in this case we also eliminate variables
from the last rounds of the cipher, expecting that the system is even easier to solve.
In this attack, we assume (to make it simple) that the entire codebook is available
and thus the data complexity is 264.
In all of our attacks we start with an 8-round truncated differential property
(see Section 3.4) ∆ = [0000022200000080] with 4 active bits found by heuristic
method:
Prob(∆→ ∆)' 2−20.51 (6.1)
The mask [0000022200000080] denotes the set of 24−1 possible differences,
excluding the zero difference. Our detailed results and discussion will be presented
in the following section.
6.3 Algebraic Attacks experiments and results
We run experiments using SAT solvers and ElimLin Algorithm on a machine with
the following characteristics
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• CPU: Intel i7-3520m 2.9GHz
• RAM: 4G
• OS: 64-bit Windows 8
Our open source implementation of Simon also includes an equation generator
which generates an algebraic equitation system for n round Simon encryption. Once
the equation is generated, we use Nicolas Courtois’ software [43] to either solve the
system by ElimLin or convert to CNF file and then solve by a SAT solver. For the
reader to check and verify our results, here are the command lines we used to get
our experimental results, software are available online [54, 43] :
• Equation generation: Simon.exe NumberOfRounds fixedKey
• ElimLin: xl0.exe /deg2 fileName
• SAT solver: xl0.exe /deg2 /sat /bard /timeout600 /cryptominisat64296 fileName
6.3.1 Experiments with 2 P/C pairs
The initial benchmark experiments were done with only 2 P/C pairs and solved by
a SAT solver using 8 round Truncated differential mask [0000022200000080] ⇒
[0000022200000080]. Table 6.1 presents our 2 P/C pairs experiment results. The
average time (in seconds) taken Taverage to solve the underlying problem by a SAT
solver is presented, while the time complexity CT (in terms of Simon encryptions)
is computed by the following formulae,
CT = 2k×2log2(Taverage∗N8REnc), (6.2)
where k is the number of bits we guess initially, NnREnc is the number of n
round Simon encryptions the experiment PC can run in 1 second.
We start from setting 1 using random Plaintext and random Ciphertext pair
(RP/RC), until we cannot solve the equations using SAT solver. We successfully
break 8 rounds Simon with guessing some key bits. The best result for 8 rounds
is fixing 80 key bits with a complexity of 2106.53. Fixing less than 80 key bits
will not be solved by SAT solver within 600 seconds. Then we try setting 2 and
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Table 6.1: Best results obtained by a SAT solver using 2P/C pairs for 8 rounds of Si-
mon64/128. k is the total number of randomly guessed key bits. The time com-
plexity for guessing is 2k. #(P/C) shows the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Taverage is the average solving time using a solver. CT is the total time complexity
for breaking the cipher, calculated based on equation 6.2. For settings see detail
in figure 6.1
#(Rounds) k #(P/C) Taverage(s) CT Setting
8 84 2 63.76 2110.08 RP/RC
8 80 2 87.38 2106.53 RP/RC
8 75 2 156.60 2102.37 SP/RC
8 75 2 515.60 2104.09 SP/SC
setting 3 to compare the results. Setting 2 using selected Plaintext and Random
Ciphertext (SP/RC) and setting 3 using selected Plaintext and selected ciphertext
(RP/RC) are better than RP/RC. However, the results in Table 6.1 show that SP/SC
is not performing any better than SP/RC. Both SP/RC and SP/SC are not improving
RP/RC a lot.
The experiment results show that for setting 2 and setting 3, using only 2 P/C
pairs cannot provide enough information (additional linear equations) to perform a
better attack than RP/RC. In the next subsection we try to increase the number of
P/C pairs and compare the results using different settings.
6.3.2 Experiments with more P/C pairs
We start by using more P/C pairs for 8 rounds Simon and we show our results in
Table 6.2. Here we start to record some features of the converted CNF files. In Table
6.2 and other SAT solver results table, n,s,h stand for number of variables, average
sparsity (the average number of literals in each clause) and hardness respectively
and m is the number of clauses in the converted CNF file. We define hardness as a
number h such that hn is the running time, where n is the number of variables. It is
known that h≤ 1.47 for 4-SAT problems [148]
Then we start to extended the current 8 rounds attack to 9 and 10 rounds. We
first extend our 8R truncated differential mask to 9 and 10 rounds as the following:
• 9R: [0000002200000080]→ [00022e4c00000222]
• 10R: [0000002200000080]→ [002e f f 9a00022e4c]
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Table 6.2: Best results obtained by a SAT solver for 8 rounds with 6 P/C pairs. n,s,h stand
for number of variables, average sparsity (the average number of literals in each
clause) and hardness respectively and m is the number of clauses in the converted
CNF file. We define hardness as a number h such that hn is the running time,
where n is the number of variables.
#(Rounds) k #(P/C) Taverage(s) CT Setting n x = mn s h
8 45 6 207.31 227.78 RP/RC 8576 6.5118 4.2761 1.0032
8 0 6 12.21 223.76 SP/RC 8576 6.5065 4.2787 1.0029
8 0 6 11.84 223.57 SP/SC 8576 6.5513 4.2631 1.0028
We manage to break 9 rounds without guessing any key bits and break 10
rounds with some key bits guessing. Our best results are shown in Table 6.3
Table 6.3: Best results obtained by a SAT solver. Table set up is the same as table 6.2.
The upper part results are using SP/RC P/C pairs, and the time compliexity for
breaking 10 rounds Simon64/128 is 2118.5 while using SP/SC with truncated
differencial properities gives 298.79. The results show the power of using well
selected data samples in algerbic cryptanlysis.
#(Rounds) k #(P/C) Taverage(s) CT Setting n x = mn s h
9 0 6 222.50 227.9 SP/RC 9536 6.70 4.31 1.0029
9 0 7 94.7 226.6 SP/RC 11104 6.70 4.31 1.0024
10 90 8 346.0 2118.5 SP/RC 13952 6.90 4.32 1.0020
9 0 6 24.24 224.7 SP/SC 9536 6.69 4.31 1.0026
9 0 7 18.56 224.3 SP/SC 11104 6.70 4.31 1.0022
10 70 10 417.73 298.79 SP/SC 17408 6.88 4.31 1.0022
Moreover, assuming Setting 3 we can break 10 rounds by guessing 70 bits of
the key initially with a time complexity of 298.79 encryptions. Note that in SP/SC
setting we always generate two P/C pairs which satisfy the truncated differential
property, and the rest pairs are generated at random.
The other two settings have failed to produce good results for 10 rounds in rea-
sonable time and this reflects the power of using pairs which follow strong truncated
differential properties. We conjecture that for a cipher of low non-linearity, there
exists a certain amount of pairs which depends on the linear relations in the cipher
which can be used to break any round.
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6.3.3 ElimLin Results
Table 6.4 presents the results using the ElimLin algorithm for solving the underlying
system of equations.
Table 6.4: Best results obtained by a ElimLin Algorithm
#(Rounds) k #(P/C) Taverage(s) CT Setting
8 0 6 824.4 229.8 SP/RC
8 0 6 583.2 229.3 SP/SC
ElimLin exploits the existence of linear equations in order to solve the system.
We have been able to break up to 8 rounds in Setting 3 without guessing any key
bits initially. Setting 1 fails, while Setting 2 is much weaker than Setting 3. The best
attack we have obtained is of time complexity 229.3 encryptions against 8 rounds of
Simon and requires pairs which satisfy the truncated differential property presented
in the previous section extended for 8 rounds.
Adding pairs which follow a strong truncated differential property is equiva-
lent to adding linear equations in the system and this is exploited by the ElimLin
algorithm. An immediate improvement is to use additional intermediate truncated
differences. This will also eliminate variables in intermediate rounds and introduce
more linear equations in the intermediate rounds. We conjecture that ElimLin is
more powerful in cases where a strong characteristic is found.
6.4 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we studied the security of Simon 64/128 cipher against algebraic
attacks and algebraic-differential attacks. We have combined two powerful cryptan-
alytic techniques: truncated differential cryptanalysis and software algebraic crypt-
analysis. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to show that such a com-
bination is powerful enough to break up to 10 rounds of a block cipher. We also
demostrated using well selected P/C pairs can significately improve software alge-
braic cryptanalysis results (compare to random selected P/C pairs). Our work was
the first algerbic cryptanalysis work on Simon. Today, it is not the best attack. But
it is important for the community to notice Simon’s low non-linearity and its low
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security against algebraic cryptanalysis.
Chapter 7
Re-Designing Algebraic Attacks
Beyond ElimLin
7.1 ElimLin Overview
Our initial algebraic cryptanalysis work on Simon was published in 2014. In 2015,
Raddum [137] published another algebraic cryptanalysis on several different ver-
sions of Simon and have broken 16 out of 72 rounds on the largest existing version
Simon128/256 using Elimlin with 20 P/C pairs of chosen plaintexts. Raddum’s
work also shows that ElimLin performs better when adding more P/C pairs.
However, it’s hard to know what happens when we add even more P/C pairs.
This is due to the limited computation power we have. A major difficulty with
ElimLin is that so far it has been successful only for relatively simple lightweight
ciphers. For more complex ciphers it seems to do things which are relatively trivial,
e.g. equations generated do not penetrate deeply inside the cipher, or very slowly,
cf. slide 153 in Courtois’ lecture notes [46].
Our work aims to make some definite progress in the direction of distinguish-
ing between trivial and non-trivial behavior for ElimLin. This is about how deeply
an ElimLin attack penetrates. Previous experience shows that ElimLin only starts
to work at a certain threshold. Before this threshold, again, nothing non-trivial can
be observed even though slow penetration occurs. This is not really apparent in any
of the current works or is lost in vast quantities of data generated in the computer
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simulations.
In this chapter, we study ElimLin behaviours with randomly selected, increas-
ing number of data samples. By collecting data from large simulations and deeply
inspecting the different types of equations generated by ElimLin, we study
1. The growth rate of equations generated by ElimLin
2. Where the higher growth rate comes from
3. If it is possible to predict when ElimLin will break a cipher
We define a new criterion which shows that it is possible to see that there
exist two very different and easily distinguishable patterns in ElimLin. Either the
attack follows one pattern, and does nothing non-trivial, or it follows another pattern
and it is very clearly doing well. Then we look deeply inside the large number of
linear equations found by ElimLin and try to classify different type of equations and
identify where the higher growth rate come from.
7.1.1 Phase transitions
It is known that many NP-hard problems are subject to “phase transition”; with cer-
tain parameters that problem is hard, and then it will rather abruptly transition from
“hard” to “easy to solve”. This is what we observe with ElimLin. Let K be the
number of Plaintext/Ciphertext (P/C) pairs used in an ElimLin attack. We are going
to discover that at a certain threshold the number of new linear and linearly inde-
pendent equations generated at various stages of the attack can follow one curve,
and then switch to another curve with a different asymptotic growth rate.
Conjecture 7.1.1 Consider a system of multivariate equations derived from a
block cipher (see toy example in 3.5 Figure 3.1). Consider a simple known plaintext
attack with K Plaintext/Ciphertext (P/C) pairs. Consider a case such that the cipher
is eventually broken by ElimLin, cf. [42, 41, 49, 47, 137]. The number of new
and linearly independent linear equations generated by the ElimLin algorithm goes
through several distinct stages St0-St3:
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St0 Initially it grows linearly with K, and for certain individual stages of the attack
is simply equal to 0 and does NOT grow, cf. our later si notation in Section
7.2.
St1 Then it switches to another curve where it grows faster than linearly in K.
St2 This is until it reaches a saturation stage where the cipher is completely
broken by ElimLin. Here we sometimes have a very rapid phase transition
(cf. Section 7.3.1) where the number of equations si generated at one stage
becomes 0 again simply because an earlier stage of the attack reaches a certain
threshold where combinatorial explosion in additional equations generated
makes it complete the whole attack and does not requite the next stage to be
executed.
One (old) example from 2007 which shows that the number of equations grows
faster than linear as a function of the data complexity K in ElimLin can be found in
Courtios and Debraize’s work in 2008 [49].
In this chapter we would like to see if this conjecture is verified in real life. We
will explain where the faster than linear growth (in St1-2) come from by inspecting
equations generated by ElimLin and discuss possible directions to improve ElimLin.
7.2 Experimental Setup and Notation
We recall the two main and only steps of ElimLin:
1 Find si linear equations in the linear span, i = 0,1,2,3, . . ..
2a If si > 0 eliminate some si variables, increment i and try again Step 1.
2b Algorithm terminates when si = 0 for some i.
In addition and by convention we are going to define a step i = 0 which is dif-
ferent than above, but the same as which is implemented in a common implementa-
tion of ElimLin [39]. We will assume that s0 will be the number of linear equations
which already appear in the equations, without executing any linear algebra. This is
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a convention which allows researchers to distinguish more easily between a “mis-
leading” starting number of variables (which is sometimes artificially inflated due to
methods used for equation generation and formal coding) and the “real” or intrinsic
number of variables which is there prior to execution or ElimLin.
Definition 13. [ElimLin progress indicators]
Let Vstart , or simply V if there is no confusion, be the initial number of variables.
We define by si the number of linear/affine equations over GF(2) generated at each
stage of the algorithm where by convention s0 is the number of linear/affine equa-
tions over GF(2) already present. We define
V ibroken =
i
∑
j=0
s j Vbroken =
∞
∑
i=0
si (7.1)
where by convention si = 0 if algorithm has reached V ibroken = V at an earlier
stage. We define also
V ibroken =V −
i
∑
j=0
s j (7.2)
and accordingly let Vunbroken = V −∑∞i=0 si. Overall we will say that the algo-
rithm terminates if Vbroken =V and Vunbroken = 0 and we deliberately ignore the fact
that some variables could be subject to a brute-force step, cf. FXL method introud-
ced by Courtois and Patarin [74]. Overall our goal is to achieve for a certain i
that
V ibroken
Vstart
= 1 or
V iunbroken
Vstart
= 0 (7.3)
To give an example of how the experiments are done1: our Simon implementa-
tion is available online [47, 39]; The ElimLin algorithm is executed using one of our
implementations of ElimLin [47, 39] which has the nice ability to display on screen
the number of linear equations generated at each stage/iteration of the algorithm.
Finally we have developed a deep inspection tool in JAVA available online [39]
1The same software setup has also been used at UCL to run a hands-on student lab session on
algebraic cryptanalysis of block ciphers [47], which is part of GA18 course on cryptanalysis taught
at UCL.
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which looks deeply inside the equations generated by ElimLin, group the equations
based on different selection criteria then provide statistics and predictions for the
growth rate of each group. For detailed instructions about how to get these values
and full experiment results, see appendix A
7.3 Experiment Results
7.3.1 The Big Picture
As already explained in Conjecture 7.1.1, we expect that there are at least 3 distinct
stages in the ElimLin algorithm. We start with the big picture, by looking at how
the value of Vunbroken evolves with K. Here we use a known plaintext setting with
no guessed key bits to break 8 round Simon64/128. As we know, adding new P/C
pairs to the ElimLin should create a linear growth in the total number of variables.
In our experiment setup and Simon encodings, each P/C pair adds 192 variables to
the starting equation system. Thus if we have two ElimLin runs, assume ElimLin
solved m1 and m2 variables with k1 and k2 P/C pairs, the unsolved variables should
equal to 192k1−m1 and 192k2−m2. We study the number of unsolved variables
left at the end of ElimLin run. By looking at the gradient of the curve to study the
growth rate of solved variables as a function of K P/C pairs. Our results are shown
in Figure 7.1 with a fitting curve using polynomial regression.
ElimLin aims to find more additional linear equations until it reach to a certain
stage that the number of linear equations is enough to solve all the variables in the
equation system. In Figure 7.1, we can see a distinction between St0 and St1. In St0
the number of unbroken variables grows with K until it reached a turning point. At
the end of St0, the equations generated by ElimLin is able to solve approximately
the same amount of variables introduced by adding new P/C pairs. Then in St1,
ElimLin starts to find more equations and solved more variables than the newly in-
troduced variables. The total number of unsolved variables start to decrease. When
the curve switches to St2, the number of unbroken variables decrease much faster
than linear and eventually break the cipher. Clearly, St1-2 is the most fundamental
stages of ElimLin. It contains the phase transition from “hard” to “easy”.
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Figure 7.1: Number of variables when ElimLin terminates Vunbroken for 8 rounds of Simon
64/128 obtained with our experiments. When K ≤ 16 the unbroken variables
increase. Variables solved by ElimLin are less or equal than variables increased
due to added new P/C pairs. We consider this is St0 in Conjecture 7.1.1. When
16 < K ≤ 50 the unsolved variables start to slowly decrease, we consider this
is St1. When K > 50 unbroken variables decrease much faster than linear and
we consider this stage as St2.
7.3.2 On Growth Rate in ElimLin
In section 7.3.1 we looked at the overall unbroken variables as a function on K P/C
pairs. We know by adding more P/C pairs, ElimLin finds more linear equations and
at the end solves all the variables and breaks the cipher. Here we look at the growth
rate on the number of newly generated equations as a function of K. On Figure
7.2 we show that early stages s0,1,2,3 (see definitions in Section 7.2) of ElimLin
algorithm on 8 rounds of Simon block cipher grows linearly. This means at the
early stage, ElimLin algorithm only finds trivial equations and the results are very
easy to predict.
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Moreover a linear progress curve would not be sufficient to break the cipher,
because the number of variables also increases linearly. In addition, initially the
attack starts with a handicap: below a certain threshold no equation exist at all,
or many types of equations (equations with similar size and characteristics, topic
which we will study later) seen in larger simulations do not yet exist at all (0 equa-
tion found).
Figure 7.2: Number of linearly independent equations generated at step 1,2,3 of the Elim-
Lin algorithm for 8 rounds of Simon 64/128. The results show in step 1,2,3 of
ElimLin, number of equations increase linearly and does not create the faster
than linear growth we oberseved in Figure 7.1.
In Figure 7.3, we show the number of linear equations generated at step 4 of
the ElimLin algorithm for 8 rounds of Simon block cipher. We have then produced
a polynomial interpolation for this data series. It grows faster than linear which is
the first stage of the attack with a positive and non-trivial outcome.
Note that we start to have s4 > 0 when K > 16. This also aligns with Figure
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Figure 7.3: Number of linearly independent equations generated in step 4 of the ElimLin
algorithm for 8 rounds of Simon 64/128. Step 4 equations appear at K=16,
and shows faster than linear increase when K > 50, this algains with the stages
appeared in Figure 7.1 when curve switch from St0-1 and St1-2.
7.1 when we see a switch from St0 to St1. This is where ElimLin starts to create a
growing number of equations which we want to grow faster than linear.
7.3.3 Predict The Success of ElimLin
Figure 7.2 and 7.3 also show that accurate prediction for growth rate of ElimLin
is feasible. Step 1,2,3 are completely linear and for Step 4 we used polynomial
regressions. The normalized squared error value R2 is very high and close to the
theoretical maximum of 1 for step 4, and also that high degree coefficients are sub-
stantially smaller (in absolute values) than lower degree polynomial coefficients.
We observe that ElimLin eventually breaks the cipher here because the number
of newly generated linear equations grows faster than the number of variables which
grows linearly with K. Eventually we obtain a sufficient number of linear equations
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which makes ElimLin compute all the variables and obtain the 128-bit secret key
together with all the intermediate variables.
However, the releations between newly generated equaltions and unbroken
variables is not yet well studied. ElimLin’s behavior in Figure 7.1 is much harder
to perdict. For example using degree 4 polynomial regressions on Figure 7.1 we
obtain the following equation with R2 = 0.9863.
Vunbroken(K) = −1.35104 K
4 +
2.07
102
K3 − 1.12 · K2 + 22.4 · K + 308.25 (7.4)
So far we have only worked with data from simulations and all our predictions
are highly accurate just because we had quite a few data points. Our paper pub-
lished in Secrypt2016 [57] showed that insufficient amount of data will be a major
difficulty when researchers in the future are going to try to build predictive models
to extrapolate and compute the complexity of simulations which they have not done.
7.3.4 Phase Transition in Other Ciphers
We do not know any counter-example which would contradict our asymptotic super-
linear growth rule. However, Simon is a particularly simple cipher. For more com-
plex ciphers, the ElimLin algorithm could have serious problems to enter this be-
havior or start working and exhibit any sort of non-trivial behavior. When ElimLin
starts to work for some cipher and produces new equations which depend on the
plaintext or ciphertext data in a non-trivial way, steady progress is observed. Except
maybe if there isn’t enough data available.
In order to see how ElimLin works with more complex ciphers, we extend our
experiment to another two ciphers: CTC2 and DES with a similar experiment set
up. For DES we use 4 rounds of DES encryption, fixed 13 out of 56 key bits and for
CTC we use 7 S-boxes per round, 4 rounds of CTC2 encryption, no fixed key bits.
Figure 7.4 and 7.5 show that both DES and CTC2 follow the phase transition
we have oberseved in Simon. Equations generated by ElimLin grow linearly at the
beginning (cf Figure 7.4), then after K is large enough (K ≤ 16 for CTC2, K ≤ 24
for DES) we start to see faster than linear growth in generated equations (see Figure
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Figure 7.4: Number of linearly independent equations generated at step 1,2 of the ElimLin
algorithm for 4 rounds of DES and CTC2. The results show in early steps of
ElimLin, number of equations increase linearly and does not create the faster
than linear growth.
7.5). The Unbroken variables curve (Figure 7.6) also match with the growth rate
in generated equations. This justifies our earllier claim, when K is large enouth,
newly generated equations grow faster than variables, eventually we obtain a suffi-
cient number of linear equations which makes ElimLin compute all the variables.
However, when working with more complex cipher like DES in a Known Plantext
Attack, ElimLin phase transition happens much later than Simon. The results we
show here are only for 4 rounds of CTC2 and DES. For larger number of rounds
we still have a long way to go before the attack goes into St1-2 resulting in much
higher data complexity and running times. This also shows one round of Simon is
substantially weaker than one round of CTC2 and DES.
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Figure 7.5: Number of linearly independent equations generated in step 4 of the ElimLin
algorithm for 4 rounds of DES and CTC2. Step 3 equations shows faster than
linear increase when K ≥ 16 for CTC2 and K ≥ 24 for DES.
7.4 Deep Inspection
We start to wonder which set or type of equations in s4 grows faster than linear. Up
till now we still don’t know what kind of equations are found when ElimLin starts
to work, and we conjecture that precisely those equations with a fast growth rate are
particularly significant and could be a sort of - up to - primary reason why we can
break the cipher for some parameters, or in combination with other equations. So
we have designed and programmed an open-source inspection tool called “DeepE-
limlin” (See Appendix B) to look inside the large number of equations generated by
ElimLin and to classify these equations into many detailed types or classes and to
visualize and analyse these types in detail. We conjecture that the hardest equations
that can be found by are equations that use many different P/C paris and involes
variables in the middle of the encryption. Thus, we decide to group the equations
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Figure 7.6: Number of variables when ElimLin terminates Vunbroken for 4 rounds of DES
and CTC2 obtained with our experiments. When K ≥ 16 for CTC2 (and K ≥ 20
for DES) the unbroken variables increase. Variables solved by ElimLin are less
or equal than variables increased due to added new P/C pairs. We consider this
is St0 in Conjecture 7.1.1. When K > 16 for CTC2 (and K > 20 for DES) the
unsolved variables start to decrease, however it’s not very clear where is the
boundary for St1 and St2.
in subcategories by
1. The number of distinct instances (P/C pairs) used: J, where J ≤ K.
2. The ElimLin execution stage: r.
3. The penetration rounds: maximal and minimal round involved in any of the
variables: Rmax and Rmin.
We postulated that in most cases the maximal round is the round which is
the most deeply embedded or close to the middle round. It is the hardest round
to penetrate for any attack, as a matter of fact. Importantly, sometimes we will
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find equations use variables from both sides (penetrating from both plaintext and
ciphertext). In this case we just use the smallest round as minimal and largest round
as maximal. It is also important to see that the cipher cannot be broken as long as
equations which combine penetration from both sides are not yet generated. This is
because equations on the plaintext side could be computed without the knowledge
of the ciphertext and vice versa. Then we don’t expect to be able to mix these
equations very well in the solving process, and identify smaller equations having
maybe a unique solution at the end of the solving process, and we don’t expect to
increase the degree so much that the equations would really interact.
We create sub-categories based on each distinct combination of these values.
An example of one equation found in s4 is given in Figure 7.7, where key variables
are compressed as k {Keybit +Keybit + ...}; the intermediate variables (input at
each round) are named based on ZR [instance] [round] [bit]. In this example we
have J = 3, s = 4, Rmax = 4 and Rmin = 5. This equation belongs to subcategory
“s4J3R5-4”.
Then we found a few sub-categories in s4 in which the number of equations
grows much faster than linear, see Table 7.1:
Table 7.1: Example of equations growing faster than linear as a function of K. This table
shows a selected group of equations that grow faster than linear as a function
of K. These equations start to appear after K ≥ 16 in step 4 (cf. Figure 7.3).
Equation group defintaion is explain above, subcategroy s4J4R3-6 means equa-
tions contains variables using 4 P/C pairs, variables in 3 to 6 round of Simon
encryption.
# of P/C pairs 16 32 64
s4J2R3-6 2 4 31
s4J3R3-6 2 6 54
s4J4R3-6 1 6 17
We discover that faster-than-linear growth happens when the variables meet in
the middle. We have also discovered that the curve of Figure 7.3 splits into different
categories in a relatively stable way, so that the curve can be viewed as essentially
a sum of 3 curves of Table 7.1 and other smaller terms. However it appears that
this splitting process depends on ElimLin’s order of elimination. More precisely
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Figure 7.7: Example of a non-trivial equation found by ElimLin. The example equation
contains variables from 3 different P/C pairs (ZR1,ZR2 and ZR3), variables
appears in mutiple middle rounds (4th and 5th round of encryption). Such
equations are considered as non trival equations and increasing faster than lin-
ear during ElimLin calculations
linear combinations of certain types of equations will sometimes (rare cases) not be
reported in our statistics because they are linearly dependent w.r.t other categories
we study. A fully objective classification would require costly computations of the
shortest possible basis for our linear space. This is actually not a problem we have
observed here, but we have seen such ambiguities in experiments with our later
scaling down heuristic, cf. next section. Current theory only guarantees that the full
result of ElimLin is independent on the order of variables [160].
7.4.1 Known Plaintext vs Chosen Plaintext
Scaling Down Method
One idea behind the scaling method is we can find equations generated for a smaller
K inside a larger simulation, if the order of elimination allows it (sometimes they
could be linearly combined with other equations). A second idea is that, therefore,
just one large ElimLin simulation reveals a lot of information about smaller simu-
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lations and about the scalability of the results as K grows. We developed a scaling
down software (inside DeepElimLin) which will estimate the number of equations
which could be found in a smaller K′. However, such predictions are not always
very accurate.
Given a set of equations E generated by ElimLin with K instances, we estimate
the number of equations for K′ < K as follows:
For each equation e ∈ E, count the equation if the largest index of instance
k < K′
One example which we found scaling down method works well is the fol-
lowing: in a chosen plaintext model for 32 round of Simon64/128, where we chose
K = 64 plaintexts in a counter mode, we obtain structured plaintext data and random
ciphertext data. We call a cube any such set of plaintexts. Some of these equations
will be actually adding the ciphertexts for all the points in the cube, which will be
exactly as in the so-called cube attack well-known in the literature [83]. However,
many others just consider some of the outputs, and therefore we also discover lots
of equations which have plaintexts which form a cube, but which are a lot more
complex and may contain arbitrary sums of arbitrary single output bits. Below we
present some results extracted from a very large simulation series.
R2 is a collection of results which has the deepest round of 2. R28 works
backwards. The predicted results are averaged based on all possible subsets with
the size of K′ out of K.
We observe that Chosen Plaintext side penetrates more rounds than the Known
Plaintext side, and the equations are shorter and less complex. Predictions are less
accurate in the deeper rounds.
Here we also show the scaling down method results for 8 Rounds CTC2 and
DES. The results are shown in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4. Both experiments are done in
KPA senerio. We oberserve simliar to SIMON, scaling down method can work well
espically in the early rounds, where the equations increase almost linerly. When
the equations meet in the middle the prediction from scaling down method become
less accurarate. This is mainly because the faster than linear growth we discussed
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Table 7.2: Example of how scaling down method works well in a Chosen Plaintext Attack
(CPA) for 32 round Simon64/128. Rn is a collection of equatrions which has the
deepest round of n. Table show the total number of equations found in collection
Rn. As running ElimLin for large number of rounds takes a lot of computational
resource, we argue that one can run one experiment (say K=64) and scale down
to predict the performance of equations generated by a smaller number of P/C
pairs (say K=32). Instead of running both experiments. Scaling down method
can save us time to run experiment and the results are relatively relaiable at least
for the earlier rounds. This table also shows that when selecting structured P/C
pairs, ElimLin can penetrates more rounds and found more linear relations in
deeper rounds compare to Known Plaintext Attack (KPA) in the ciphertext side.
The results also align with our work in Chapter 6.
Real K=32 Predicted K=32 Real K=64
R2 224 225.17 448
R3 448 419.67 848
R4 372 336.17 716
R5 104 68 279
R6 123 56.17 327
R7 118 61.83 314
R8 63 41 176
R28 1 0.83 4
R31 1024 1029.33 2048
in previous Sections. Looking at only one K value (i.e K=16) is simply not enough
to predict if equations are growing linearly or faster than linear.
Table 7.3: Example of how scaling down method works well in a Known Plaintext Attack
(KPA) for 8 round CTC. Rn is a collection of equatrions which has the deepest
round of n. Table show the total number of equations found in collection Rn.
Equations that contains data from both side are considered as meet in the middle
equations and are counted into R4.
Real K=16 Predicted K=16 Real K=32
R1 265 267.32 536
R2 161 158.46 308
R3 144 144.17 288
R4 421 472.67 996
R5 145 144.83 288
R6 165 163 326
R7 264 267.32 536
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Table 7.4: Example of how scaling down method works well in a Known Plaintext Attack
(KPA) for 8 round DES. Rn is a collection of equatrions which has the deepest
round of n. Table show the total number of equations found in collection Rn.
Equations that contains data from both side (i.e 3 and 5) are considered as meet
in the middle equations and are counted into R4.
Real K=8 Predicted K=8 Real K=16
R1 640 640 1280
R2 640 640.33 1280
R3 640 691.7 1384
R4 1666 1472 2863
R5 640 651.33 1304
R6 640 658.83 1332
R7 658 668.24 1348
7.5 Equations In ElimLin vs. Direct Approximation
Given K random plaintexts, how many linear equations are true for every key which
combine variables from K copies of 32 variables inside round Nr of encryption?
In addition we know the K plaintexts and will study the equations which exist for
some fixed K plaintexts, which means that we will in general find more equations
than those true for every plaintext. However, such equations are allowed in ElimLin
attack where the plaintext is known. We should also note that many such equations
do not depend on the plaintext (some do), and typically the total number of such
equations does not depend a lot on the choice of K random plaintexts, though it will
be substantially bigger in a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) which penetrates deeper
inside the cipher (see Chapter 6).
These equations can be computed by standard linear algebra method: we need
to compute a kernel of a certain Macaulay matrix [classical method in algebraic
cryptanalysis]. We write a matrix in which lines are examples of internal data for
different keys and columns represent various monomials, which are all linear in this
case. The number of keys should be slightly higher than the number of columns,
e.g. 100 more. The computation of the kernel of this matrix gives a basis for the
equations which are true for every key and related to our monomials. This is a
heuristic method which works with a large probability close to 1. For example,
if we have Pi/Ci being the plaintext/ciphertext variables, and R1, . . .R100 are the
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internal variables, we might discover that for every key and for a fixed plaintext P
we have R2⊕R7 = 1. This is, of course, just an example.
7.5.1 Polynomial Approximation in Practice
We have programmed this method of recovery of the equations from the data. The
command line is:
ax64 9051777 32 128 Nr K 0 /fix80 /seed1
This recovers the equations in a totally general Known Plaintext (KP) attack
with random plaintexts. For example we obtain:
ax64 9051777 32 128 6 2 0 /fix80 /seed1-100
0.05 found on average
ax64 9051777 32 128 6 4 0 /fix80 /seed1-100
0.45 found on average
ax64 9051777 32 128 6 8 0 /fix80 /seed1-100
3.4 found on average
We have analyzed the results obtained for 6 and 7 rounds and we obtained:
F(6)≈ 0.0002K2+32K−724
F(7)≈ 0.00003K2+32K−12848
More generally we conjecture that the quadratic part would disappear for larger
K, and it is possible to show that:
Proposition 3 (Theoretical Upper Bound on ElimLin Attack). The number linear
equations which ElimLin can find in KPA scenario is at most:
F ≤ 32K− (T −κ)
where κ is the key size, T is the cardinal of the union of the sets of monomials in ki
which appear in the union of ANF expressions (Algebraic Normal Forms are simply
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polynomials over F2) of all outputs of the cipher as a function of the key variables
ki and plaintext variables. of K plaintexts.
Moreover (in practice) this number T − κ does not change when we select
another set of K random plaintexts and for larger K we have:
FK→∞→ 32K− (T −κ)
and starting from a certain threshold K we typically have F = 32K− (T −κ)
exactly (experimental).
Proof (Sketch): For one plaintext Pi each output is a Boolean function which in-
volves a certain number T (Pi) of monomials in the k j. Moreover if we concatenate
sets of monomials for several plaintexts we expect to quickly reach an upper limit
T (Pi)≤ T where T is the total number of monomials in the k j in the 32 polynomials
which are functions of both Pi and the k j. For every Pi the polynomials contain a
subset of these T monomials.
For a fixed plaintext we form a Macaulay matrix in which lines are different
keys and different encryptions, and columns are 32K variables corresponding to ZLi
after round Nr (left hand side created in Nr round of Simon encryption i out of K),
plus κ key variables. Then it will have at most T linearly independent columns, as
all columns could be written as linear combinations of other columns which could
be added for all possible monomials in key variables, and the κ linear monomials in
key variables are those which we already had in equations found by our software.
It is hard to prove F = 32K− (T −κ) exactly for larger values, but this is what
we observe in practice in algebraic cryptanalysis, for example [74] and here.
Experimental Results
Here we present a more elaborate example than in our Proposition 3. Our experience
show that results of experiments can be predicted with near 100% accuracy and
there is typically more than one interval where the number of linear dependencies
follow a linear curve with different values of T and for a subset of 32 bits. Our
interpretation is that the same sort of result holds for a subset of output bits however
for some subsets the value T is smaller because they depend on less key bits. Our
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experiment results for 8R Simon64/128 KP are given in Figure 7.8. It is clear to
see that there are three different stages before it reaches F = 32K− (T −κ). For
a smaller K we observe F = 6K− T ′ and then increase to F = 27K− T ′′, where
T ′ < T ′′ < T .
Here we also privide an example of ElimLin not finding as many equations as
in theoretical upper bound in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5: ElimLin vs Upper bound. We show the number of linear equations actual found
by ElimLin and the theoretical upperbound for K = 1,2,4...64. ElimLin can
only found a subset of equations compare to the theoretical upperbound
# of P/C pairs 1 2 4 8 16 32 64
ElimLin R4 11 28.82 46.63 86.39 167.77 336.17 716
Max Theor. R4 23 95 119 247 503 1015 2039
Application — Prediction of Attack Complexity In our research we have NOT
yet achieved our goal to be able to reliably predict the complexity of ElimLin at-
tacks which we cannot yet run; but our SECRYPT paper results covered in this and
previous sections suggest that this is feasible and here is one possible method to
achieve it.
Conjecture 7.5.1.1 (Application of Proposition 3). We can use the estimation of
type 32K−C for the number of linearly independent equations which propagate
from the plaintext side, another 32K−C which will be obtained from the ciphertext
side, and estimate that the whole cipher is broken by a meet-in-the middle attack
when 2(32K−C) ≈ 32K. Then we can estimate how many additional equations
need to be added to ElimLin to complete, and we should be able to conclude that
ElimLin+ attack (cf. next section) will break 2Nr of rounds as soon as this lower
threshold is met.
This method requires more development in terms of comparing the estimations
to actual large ElimLin runs but we are the first to ever propose a plausible method
to extrapolate the complexity of an improved form of ElimLin attack.
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7.6 Conclusions and Future Work
ElimLin is a simple algorithm and works well for small number of rounds. Like
other solving tools for Algebraic Cryptanalysis, it does not scale for larger number
of rounds due to solving complexity. For a long time in Algebraic Cryptanalysis
research, ElimLin was just used as a black box solving tool. In this chapter, we
looked inside ElimLin algorithm and studied the equations generated by ElimLin at
different solving stages. Contributions in this chapter are:
• We introduced the phase transistions in ElimLin algorithm and expeimentally
showed such phase transistions exist for more than one cipher.
• By looking at the number of linear independent equations found by ElimLin
as a function of P/C pairs, We have identified the source and the nature of
cryptanalytic success of ElimLin. It comes from several phenomena: equa-
tions emerge by thresholds, they meet in the middle, they exhibit super-linear
growth in some (crucial) cases.
• We have also discovered how to efficiently generate a lot more equations
which ElimLin does not typically find and provided a possible future appli-
cation of ElimLin in Conjecture 7.5.1.1
We have all the ingredients. However, designing a really optimal algebraic attack
on a block cipher is not an easy task due to the large complexity of the equations
we have discovered. We feel that each class of equations could be computed faster
by a dedicated method, and we have already computed many substantially faster by
our Polynomial Approximation method above. Future research is needed on how
ElimLin needs to be enhanced in practice and what kind trade-offs can be observed
between the cost of computing various classes of equations we have already seen
and others we have not yet fully integrated in ElimLin algorthim. In Section 7.6.1
we will review the works we have done in Part II and discuss the plan of our future
work on Algebraic Cryptanalysis.
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7.6.1 Algebraic Attacks Beyond ElimLin
Many researchers consider algebraic cryptanalysis as an independent cryptanalysis
research area called deterministic cryptanalysis, while differential and linear crypt-
analysis methods are called probabilistic methods in cryptography [131]. However,
we argue that there are a lot of connections between algebraic cryptanalysis, linear
and differential cryptanalysis. In Figure 7.9, we describe our view of the connec-
tions between these cryptanalytic techniques.
Figure 7.9: Classification of cryptanalysis methods and their connections. Most of the ex-
isting literature considered algebraic cryptanalysis as an independent research
area compare to probablisitic cryptanalysis methods such as differencial crypt-
analysis (DC) and linear cryptanalysis (LC). We believe Algebraic Attacks has
many connections. probablisitic method are often used together with Alge-
braic methods and in some attacks presented in this thesis they improved Al-
gebraic Attacks performance by introduction new equations to the mathematic
model and reduced solving complexity at the solving stage of Algebraic At-
tacks. Boxes colored in red are normally considered as LC. Yellow boxes are
normally considered as DC methods. Green boxes are the parts included in this
thesis and blue boxes are considered as specific solving methods
A link between ElimLin and linear cryptanalysis in Figure 7.9 reflects the fact
that both of these methods are looking for linear relations inside the cipher. How-
ever, a major difference between these two approaches is ElimLin looks for equa-
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tions that work only for a particular set of P/C pairs2. Cube attack which was intro-
duced by Dinur and Shamir in 2009 [83] chooses a subset of ’public’ input bits such
that the sum of an output bit value is a linear combination of the key after a certain
summation over a cube composed of plaintexts where a subset of bits varies. Cube
attack can sometimes be linear and sometimes non-linear which can be seen as re-
lated to both ElimLin and Non-Linear Cryptanalysis (NLC) sometimes called Gen-
eralized Linear Cryptanalysis (GLC). Researchers have studied how well-selected
samples from cube attack can be used to improve the performance of ElimLin [162].
One key focus is how different cryptanalysis techniques can be used to improve soft-
ware algebraic attacks by adding more equations which makes that these attacks
themselves will find yet more equations (amplification effect).
Guess-then-solve method is a general cryptanalysis method which can be used
in many attack scenarios. In Chapter 5 we explored this type of attacks on Russian
GOST cipher and show this method can be used to improve algebraic cryptanalysis
with SAT solvers. In Chapter 6 we discussed how well-selected samples following
a truncated differential property can reduce the solving complexity of ElimLin and
SAT solvers. Both methods can be considered as adding additional linear equations
into algbraic solving stage.
In Section 7.5 we discussed the theretical upper bound of equations that can
be found by ElimLin. We conjectured that one can precompute additional linear
equations that cannot be found by ElimLin, and provid those equations at the be-
gining of solving step. We call ElimLin+ any attack which combines ElimLin with
additional equations generated by polynomial approximation as in this chapter. Our
future work directions will consider to develop an attack using ElimLin+ on a con-
crete cipher and show it can break larger number of rounds than normal ElimLin
method.
2although some equations might exist for any P/C pairs
Part III
Speed Optimisation for Bitcoin Brain
Wallet Attacks
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Chapter 8
Improving Brain Wallet Attacks
In Chapter 4 we described the general concept of Ellipitic Curve and Bitcoin brain
walltes. Brain wallets is a deterministic method to generate Bitcoin private keys
from a password. This means once an attacker knows the password, they can recover
the pravite key and get control of the Bitcoins within the wallet. Brain wallets exist
because Bitcoin users prefer to rememeber a password instead of keeping a long
random string in a safe place. However, existing research discussed in Section 4.9.1
shows an attacker can simpely use a dictionary attack to guess the passwords. The
security of Bitcoin Brain wallets only depends on the strength of the password.
The speed of checking if a guessed password leads to a used brain wallet only
depends on the key generation process in the Bitcoin elliptic curve secp256k1. In
this chapter we will review the current implementation of Bitcoin elliptic curve
and provide detailed benchmarks on each elliptic curve opteration during the key
geneartion process. At the end we will implement a new attack in order to speed up
the key geneartion process and improve the existing attack.
8.1 Bitcoin Elliptic Curve Implementation and
Benchmarking
8.1.1 Dedicated Scalar Multiplication Method
The process of cracking Bitcoin brain wallets is to repeatedly generated public keys
using guessed passwords. The key generation method as we described in 4.6.2,
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is to compute Q = dP. Here d is a SHA256 hash of the generated password, P
is a fixed point which is the base point G for secp256k1 (see Section 4.8). We
first benchmark the current best implementation secp256k1 library. All benchmark
results are running on a Intel i7-3520m 2.9GHz laptop (win8 x64).
The time cost for computing one public key given a random private key takes
47.2 us.
8.1.1.1 Fixed Point Multiplication Methods
The most basic and naive method for point multiplication Q = kP with a unknown
point P is the double-and-add method [100]. The idea is to use binary representation
for k:
k = k0+2k1+22k2+ · · ·+2mkm
where [k0 . . .km]∈ {0,1} and m is the length of k, in Bitcoin elliptic curve, m= 256.
Algorithm 5 Double-and-add method for point multiplication of unknown points
[100] page 96
INPUT: k = (km, ...,k1,k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq).
OUTPUT: kP.
1: Q := infinity
2: for i from 0 to m do
3: if ki = 1 then Q := Q+P (using point addition)
4: P := 2P (using point doubling)
5: end for
6: return Q
The expected number of ones in the binary representation of k is approximately
m
2 , so the double-and-add method will need
m
2 A+mD computations (where A means
point addition and D means point doubling) in total. However, if the point P is
fixed and some storage is available, then the point multiplication operation Q =
kP can be accelerated by pre-computing some data that depends only on P. For
example if the points 2P,22P, . . . ,2m−1P are precomputed, then the double-and-add
method (Algorithm 5) has an expected running time of (m2 )A, and all doublings are
eliminated.
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In 1993, Brickell et al introduced a new method for fixed point multiplication
[26] . The precomputing step stores every multiple 2iP. Let (Kd−1, . . . ,K1,K0)2w
be the base-2w representation of k, where d = [m/w], and let Q j = ∑i:Ki= j 2
wiP for
each j, 1≤ j ≤ 2w−1, Then
kP =
d1
∑
i=0
Ki(2wiP) =
2w−1
∑
j=1
( j ∑
i:Ki= j
2wiP =
2w−1
∑
j=1
jQ j
= Q2w−1+(Q2w−1+Q2w−2)+ · · ·+(Q2w−1+Q2w−2+ · · ·+Q1) (8.1)
Algorithm 6 Fixed-base windowing method for point multiplication[100]
INPUT: Window width w, d = [m/w], k = (Kd−1, . . . ,K1,K0)2w
OUTPUT: kP
1: Precompute Pi = 2wiP,0≤ i≤ d−1
2: A← infinity, B← infinity
3: for j from 2w−1 down to 1 do
4: For each i for which Ki = j do: B← B+Pi
5: A← A+B
6: end for
7: return A
Algorithm 6 has expected running time of
(2w+d−3)A.
By reviewing the literature and checking some other existing methods in Hanker-
son’s book [100] we noticed they are all memory friendly implementations which
do not take a lot of memory for precomputation. However, we are working on a
different task and aim at repeatedly running point multiplication method for great
many times. We have implemented an extreme version of the window method which
will take much more precomputation space than methods introduced by Hankerson
[100].
In our implementation, the precomputation step will compute Pj = jP where
1 ≤ j ≤ 2w− 1 then for each Pj we compute Pi, j = 2wiPj, which will cost 2w− 1
times more memory space than algorithm 6, but expected running time for each
8.1. Bitcoin Elliptic Curve Implementation and Benchmarking 129
point multiplication will reduce to approximately (d−1)A
Algorithm 7 Our implementation of windowing method with larger precomputation
table
INPUT: Window width w, d = [m/w], k = (Kd−1, . . . ,K1,K0)2w
OUTPUT: kP
1: Precompute Pi, j = 2wi jP,0≤ i≤ d−1 and 1≤ j ≤ 2w−1
2: A← infinity
3: for i from 0 to d−1 do
4: A← A+Pi, j where j = Ki
5: end for
6: return A
We have implemented a code that can take any window width w from 1 to
241, our benchmark results are shown in Table 8.1. Note that precomputation stores
elliptic curve point P = x,y where x and y are 32 bits integer array of size 10. So
one stored point needs 80 Bytes memory space.
Table 8.1: Time cost for different window width w, point addition method secp256k1 li-
brary [167] secp256k1 gej add ge
w=4 w=8 w=12 w=16 w=20
d 64 32 22 16 13
number of additions 63 31 21 15 12
precomputation memory 81.92 KB 655.36 KB 7.21 MB 83.89 MB 1.09 GB
time cost 46.36 us 22.76 us 15.35 us 11.23 us 9.23 us
8.1.2 Point Representation
As we described in Section 4.3, representing a point in affine coordinate P(x,y) on
an elliptic curve over Fp, the field operations for calculating point addition needs 2
multiplications, 1 square and one modular inverse (for short, 2M+1S+1I). Modular
inverse is a more expensive operation compared to multiplication and square. We
list our benchmarks using different package in C to demonstrate the difference for
modular inverse computation compare to multiplication and square. The packages
we have benchmarked are: OpenSSL-1.0.2a (released in March 2015) and mpir-
2.5.2 (released in Oct 2012), and the Pieter Wuille’s implementation on github [167]
1larger than 22 will take too long for precomputation and my laptop start to have slow response
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Table 8.2: Benchmarking OpenSSL and MPIR library for field multiplication, square and
modular inverse in affine coordinate
multiplication mod p square mod p mod inverse
MPIR 0.07 us 0.15 us 0.13 us 0.15 us 18.0 us
OpenSSL 0.08 us 0.43 us 0.06 us 0.43 us 1.8 us
secp256k1 0.049 us 0.039 us 1.1 us
2 .
The results are shown in Table 8.2. The benchmarking shows modular inverse
is much more expensive than multiplication and square. It is also important to
notice, for OpenSSL Big Number library, a square operation is more expensive than
multiplication, and for MPIR library, 1 square = 0.75 multiplication. As modular
inverse is more expensive than multiplication, it may be advantageous to represent
points using other coordinates.
Projective Coordinates
For elliptic curve over Fp where the curve equation is y2 = x3 + ax+ b. The stan-
dard projective coordinates represent elliptic curve points as (X : Y : Z), Z 6= 0,
correspond to the affine point (XZ ,
Y
Z ). The projective equation of the elliptic curve
is:
Y 2Z = X3+aXZ2+bZ3
The point at infinity O corresponds to (0:1:0), where the negative of (X : Y : Z) is
(X :−Y : Z)
Jacobian Coordinates
Elliptic curve points in Jacobian coordinate are represented in the following format
(X : Y : Z), Z 6= 0, corresponds to the affine point ( XZ2 , XZ3 ). The projective equation
of the elliptic curve is
Y 2 = X3+aXZ4+bZ6
The point at infinity O corresponds to (1:1:0), while the negative of (X : Y : Z) is
(X :−Y : Z).
2with the following configuration: USE NUM GMP USE FIELD 10x26
USE FIELD INV NUM USE SCALAR 8x32 USE SCALAR INV BUILTIN
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The field operations needed for point addition and point doubling are shown in
Table 8.3. We see that Jacobian coordinates yield the fastest point doubling, while
mixed Jacobian-affine coordinates yield the fastest point addition.
Table 8.3: Operation counts for point addition and doubling. A = affine, P = standard pro-
jective, J = Jacobian [100, 29]
Doubling General addition Mixed coordinates*
2A→ A 1I,2M,2S A+A→ A 1I,2M,1S J+A→ J 8M,3S
2P→ P 7M,3S P+P→ P 12M,2S
2J→ J 4M,4S J+J→ J 12M,4S
* Here mixed coordinates means Jacobian-Affine mixed coordinates, see below for
details.
We refer the reader to [100, 29] for other detailed equations in different coor-
dinates. Here we are only interested in point addition functions using mixed coor-
dinates.
Point Addition using Jacobian-Affine Mixed Coordinates
Let P=(X1 :Y1 : Z1) be a Jacobian projective point on elliptic curve y2 = x3+ax+b,
and Q=(X2 : Y2 : 1) be be another point on the curve, suppose that P 6=±Q, P+Q=
(X3 : Y3 : Z3) is computed by the following equations:
X3 =(Y2Z31−Y1)2− (X2Z21−X1)2(X1+X2Z21)
Y3 =(Y2Z31−Y1)(X1(X2Z21−X1)2−X3)−Y1(X2Z21−X1)3
Z3 =(X2Z21−X1)Z1
(8.2)
By storing the intermediate elements, X3,Y3 and Z3 can be computed using
three field squarings and eight field multiplications as follows:
A← Z21 , B← Z1 ·A, C← X2 ·A, D← Y2 ·B, E←C−X1,
F ← D−Y1, G← E2, H← G ·E, I← X1 ·G,
X3← F2− (H +2I), Y3← F · (I−X3)−Y1 ·H, Z3← Z1 ·E.
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secp256k1 point addition formulas In the latest version, secp256k1 point addi-
tion formulas are based on Brier and Joye’s work [27] which introduced a strongly
unified addition formulas for standard projective coordinate. Bitcoin developers im-
plemented mixed coordinate formula (Jacobian-Affine) version based on Brier and
Joye’s work [27].
Let P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) be a Jacobian projective point on elliptic curve y2 =
x3 + ax+ b, and Q = (X2 : Y2 : 1) be be another point on the curve, suppose that
P 6=±Q, P+Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) is computed by the following equations:
X3 = 4(K2−H)
Y3 = 4(R(3H−2K2)−G2)
Z3 = 2FZ1
(8.3)
where
A = Z21 , B = Z1 ·A, C = X2 ·A, D = Y2 ·B, E = X1+C
F = Y1+D,G = F2,H = E ·G, I = E2,J = X1 ·C,K = I− J
Bernstein-Lange point addition formulas In [16], Bernstein introduced the fol-
lowing method which takes 7M+4S; the explicit formulas are given as following
[15]
X3 = r2− J−2V
Y3 = r · (V −X3)−2Y1 · J
Z3 = (Z1+H)2−Z21 −H2
(8.4)
where
U2 = X2 ·Z21 , S2 = Y2 ·Z31
H =U2−X1, I = 4H2
J = H · I, r = 2(S2−Y1), V = X1 · I
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Detailed Filed Operation Benchmarks
From the results of Table 8.2 we saw that Wuille’s secp256k1 library [167] has a
much faster field multiplication and square speed than OpenSSL and mpir library.
Wuille’s field implementation is optimised based on the prime used in secp256k1
curve. Secp256k1 library has 5x52 and 10x26 field implementation for 64 bits
and 32 bits integers 3. Here we use 10x26 representation and each 256 bits value
is represented as a 32 bits integer array with size of 10. We refer readers to file
field 10x26 impl.h in secp256k1 library for more details. Secp256k1 library already
implemented equation 8.3 in method secp256k1 gej add ge var, which uses 8 mul-
tiplications, 3 squares and 12 multiply integer / addition / negation. Equation 8.2 is
implemented in secp256k1 gej add ge which uses 7 multiplications, 5 squares and
21 multiply integer / addition / negation. We have implemented equation 8.4 which
take 7 multiplication, 4 squares and 21 multiply integer / addition / negation.
It is important to notice the square and multiplication difference which we
discussed in Table 8.2. In [77] Bernstein listed best operation counts based on
different assumptions: S = 0M, S = 0.2M, S= 0.67M, S=0.8M and S=1M. Cohen
discussed the ratio S/M is almost independent of the field of definition and of the
implementation, and can be reasonably taken to equal to 0.8 [34]. Our benchmark
results are very similar to S = 0.8M (see Table 8.2) . In Bernstein’s work [15], other
field operations are considered as 0M. In Table 8.4 our benchmark results show field
addition and other operations have approximately 0.1M cost.
Table 8.4: Field operation counts and benchmark results
#Mul #Square #add/neg/*int #fe cmov total time cost
1M ≈ 0.8 M ≈ 0.1 M ≈ 0.2 M
secp256k1 gej
add ge 7 5 15 6 ≈ 0.681 us
secp256k1 gej
add ge var 8 3 12 0 ≈ 0.562 us
7M + 4S code 7 4 21 0 ≈ 0.594 us
The secp256k1 gej add ge method, which is also the default method for key
generation, uses 6 secp256k1 fe cmov operations which have a cost approximately
3Depends on whether compiler support 64 bits integer
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0.2 M. The main reason of writing code in such a way is stated in the code, and the
author’s comments:
”This formula has the benefit of being the same for both addition of
distinct points and doubling”[167]
The purpose of make addition and double using the same function is to prevent
side channel attacks. As point doubling is much more cheaper than point addi-
tion. Our experiments are done based on the benchmark results of S/M ratio with
specified machine setting (earlier in Section 8.1.1) and a specific library configu-
ration (footnote in Section 8.1.2). Different operating systems or library config-
urations might have different results. One should choose between our code and
secp256k1 gej add ge method. Detailed benchmark results are given in Table 8.5
Table 8.5: Time cost for different window width w for EC key generation
w=4 w=8 w=12 w=16 w=20
d 64 32 22 16 13
# of additions 63 31 21 15 12
precomputation
memory 81.92 KB 655.36 KB 7.21 MB 83.89 MB 1.09 GB
secp256k1 gej
add ge 45.85 us 22.16 us 15.35 us 11.23 us 9.23 us
secp256k1 gej
add ge var 37.37 us* 17.86 us 12.21 us 8.89 us 7.16 us
7M + 4S code 39.01 us 18.79 us 12.77 us 9.23 us 7.48 us
Jacobian to Affine ≈ 10 us
Benchmark on
my laptop
≈ 42 K guesses / sec (single thread)
on i7-3520m 2.9 GHz CPU
DEF CON Attack**
≈ 130 K guesses / sec
on i7-2600 3.2 GHz CPU
Improved
DEF CON Attack ≈ 315 K guesses / sec
* DEF CON attack [31] is equivalent to this results
** Results are reported by Ryan Castellucci running his DEF CON code and our
improved code on 8 threads with linux gcc compiler.
DEF CON attack [31] published code on github in Aug using a faster version of
secp256k1 library 4, and the results is marked as * in Table 8.5. Our best result using
4Also written by Pieter Wuille one year ago, this version is performance focused and using
8M+3S
8.2. On Cracked Brain Wallets 135
1.09 GB precomputation memory gives ≈ 2.5 times speed-up for key generation
process than the current known best attack.
Some work in this chapter has been developed into teaching materials for the
UCL M.Sc. Information Security course, including low level c/c++ programming
for field operation, ECDSA implementation and countermeasures against side chan-
nel attacks.
8.2 On Cracked Brain Wallets
Our work has focused on providing the first detailed benchmark of existing Bitcoin
elliptic curve implementations and optimizing the speed of the state-of-art Bitcoin
brain wallets attack. We did not pay attention to analysing the cracked brain wal-
lets. We refer the reader to read Vasek’s paper [164] for a detailed measurement
of cracked brain wallets results. In this section we only give a brief summary of
our results and discuss some interesting points which are not covered by Vasek’s
research.
We have collected all hash160 on blockchain data (until June 2015).
89,872,723 unique addresses have ever been used, and we have cracked 18,350
addresses in total. All of them were empty at the time we found them. It is clear
that the majority of addresses had been registered by a single entity (some sort
of bounty or honeypot). 17784 brain wallets were first used on August 31, 2013
and have the same transaction amount 0.00005460 bitcoin or precisely twice this
amount. The largest amount ever seen in one brain wallet was 500 BTC.
8.2.1 Network Stress Test
The maximum block size of Bitcoin is one megabyte per block. On 11 November
2014, when the block was around 30% full, David Hunduson wrote a blog post
[105] analyzing what will happen as the network approaches 100% full. The au-
thor did a simulation which shows that if the block is 100% full, then 10% of all
transactions would still not have received a confirmation after 22800 seconds (Bit-
coin transcations are normally confirmed after around 600 seconds). Later, on 4th
May 2015, Gavin Andersen published his first in a series of blog posts [5] aimed
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at convincing the Bitcoin community to adopt a larger block size. This sparked a
heated debate about the Bitcoin blocksize that broke past the technical developers
of the Bitcoin protocol into the broader sphere of people that care about Bitcoin.
As a result of this debate, several network stress tests were launched. We measured
some aftermath of this contentious test, since the perpetrator / originator chose to
send large quantities of small amounts of bitcoin to selected brain wallets. Between
28th June 2015 and 28th August 2015, we observed 41 addresses used in the net-
work stress test (also known as “July flood attack”) with a total number of 1,554,187
transactions and total amount of 46.8 BTC.
8.2.2 Disclosure of Results
Although all the cracked brain wallets are currently empty, we still decided not
to publish a full list of cracked passwords or Bitcoin addresses because users can
make the same mistake again. Even statistical information about weak wallets
helps attackers to steal more bitcoins. We have given some sample passwords in
appendix C. One possible way for disclosure is to tag the cracked addresses on
blockchain.info. See Figure 8.1. Bitcoin users can see if their brain wallet address
is cracked. But the process is not automated due to captcha requirement and we do
have a lot of cracked passwords.
Figure 8.1: Example of tagged brain wallet address
8.3 Summary
In this chapter we have analysed and improved the state of the art on the imple-
mentation of the secp256k1 elliptic curve and similar curves. We provided the first
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benchmarks on existing implementations and provided a faster implementation for
specific applications where private keys are not manipulated or there exist other pro-
tections against side channel attacks [e.g. physical and electro-magnetic isolation]
and when larger amounts of RAM are available. We are able to examine passwords
in brain wallets 2.5 times faster than the state of the art implementation presented
at DEF CON. We have released our source code. As an example application of this
research, we have been able to crack thousands of passwords including some quite
difficult ones.
The idea behind Bitcoin brain wallets is elegant: remembering a password or
passphrase is surely easier than a private key. Our work and also Vasek’s work [164]
have made a clear point that it is an extremely insecure way to store bitcoin. There
exist lots of other methods to keep bitcoin more secure. As a result of our research,
the first and widely suggested brain wallet generation website brainwallet.org has
been permanently closed.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
This thesis mainly focuses on improving algebraic cryptanalysis with software and
solvers. Algebraic cryptanalysis is powerful as it requires small quantities of data,
but in general the complexity grows quickly as the number of rounds increases.
Many mitigations to improve runtimes are studied. We explored different types of
optimization processes meant to make algebraic cryptanalysis problems transition
from “hard to solve” to “easier to solve” by a software solver. We applied these
optimizations to concrete ciphers and demonstrated the improvements. We aim to
contribute to future government standards, such as Simon and other widely used ci-
phers including new releases of GOST. We proposed several possible optimizations
for algebraic cryptanalysis and experimentally demonstrated the attacks on GOST
and Simon, which were submitted to ISO. We explore many powerful enhancements
for algebraic attacks, and in one case we show a result which upper bounds can be
obtained, and suggest a new method to predict the complexity of future attacks. We
also propose an optimized attack for Bitcoin brain wallet attack.
In Chapter 5, we introduced a new notion of contradiction immunity and SAT
immunity, which converts a first stage in cryptanalysis of GOST to an optimization
problem. Then we implemented a guess-then-solve attack with a well chosen set of
guessed bits. This attack later directly improved the current best attack on GOST.
Incidentally GOST was rejected by ISO at that time.
In Chapters 6 we studied NSA block cipher Simon which was introduced in
2013 and submitted to ISO in 2015. We introduced a new method that uses well
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selected P/C pairs which follow a truncated differential property for algebraic crypt-
analysis, and demonstrated the improvement on basic algebraic attacks on Simon
with an extremely detailed study of what happens inside the attack and a serious im-
provement which generates more equations directly. Our work breaks 10/48 rounds
of Simon64/128 with less than 10 P/C pairs. We disagree when some researchers
believe that Simon should not be studied by academics:
“because it dignifies [the designs] and wastes the cycles the brain
cycles of intelligent people, by going to look at a thing that is produced
by a bad actor agency [(the NSA)].”
— Jacob Appelbaum, FSE 2015 invited talk
We propose an opposite view: it is important for the research community to
study Simon because it is likely to become an important industry standard in the fu-
ture. We published the first algebraic cryptanalysis work on Simon in 2014. Today,
it is not the best attack. But it is important for the community to notice Simon’s low
multipicative complexity, low non-linearity and its low security against algebraic
cryptanalysis.
In our research we spent a lot of time on contemplating what happens inside
ElimLin algorithm. It contains a rich variety of attacks, for example, various gen-
eralizations of cube attacks not previously studied. ElimLin is a powerful tool for
algebraic cryptanalysis, but with a fundamental limitation on computational com-
plexity. When trying to solve larger number of rounds, the converted problems get
much more bigger and ElimLin can not provide an answer within a short time. With
a large number of experiments using ElimLin on Simon, we show that precise pre-
diction for ElimLin is possible. We have made progress in both understanding better
and extending/enhancing the ElimLin attack. Our discovery method of Section 7.5
suggests that the same equations can yet be computed a lot more efficiently.
Finally, we also looked at the widely used cryptography application – ECDSA
in Bitcoin with the secp256k1 curve. Elliptic curve problems themselves are hard
algebraic cryptanalysis problems with complex polynomials and sometimes equa-
tions which follow the same topology as in a block cipher. Here nobody is yet able
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to propose advanced practical attacks. Another application we studied is Bitcoin. It
was invented in 2008 and has grown rapidly since 2012, and it’s one of the largest
ECC practical applications in the world. We studied how some users manage their
private keys and the security pitfalls related to this. Bitcoin uses a special elliptic
curve secp256k1 which has not been widely used by any previous application, and
in this thesis we provide a detailed benchmark of all the major implementations
of this curve, and propose an optimized password cracking attack on Bitcoin brain
wallets with a slightly unusual ECC speed optimization. Our work together with
other researchers work had made the Bitcoin community aware that brain wallets
are extremely insecure.
Appendix A
Full Instruction for ElimLin
Experiments
Software Setup:
1. Simon.exe: http://www.nicolascourtois.com/software/simon.exe
- Source code: https://github.com/GSongHashrate/SimonSpeck
- Documentation: section Simon inside: http://www.cryptosystem.net/aes/toyciphers.html
2. ax64.exe: http://www.nicolascourtois.com/software/ax64.exe
- Documentation: http://www.cryptosystem.net/aes/tools.html
3. cryptominisat-2.9.6-win64.exe http://www.nicolascourtois.com/software/cryptominisat-
2.9.6.-win64.exe
- Sources and documentation: http://www.msoos.org/cryptominisat2/
Command Line:
Simon.exe NR /fixkF /insK /xl0, where NR = number of rounds for the cipher,
F = number of fixed/guessed bits for the key and K = number of random plain-
text/ciphertext pairs used.
Command Line output might look like:
Simon.exe 16 /fixk0 /ins8 /xl0
...
10496+ 512+ 448+ 257+ 1+ 0
Elim[ 14208] 0.529 h 2494/3712 ...
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In this case NR = 16, F = 0, K = 8. The output is interpreted as follows:
Simon.exe 16 /fixk0 /ins8 /xl0
...
r0+ r1+ r2+ r3+ r4+ r5
Elim[ Total(= r0+Vstart)] 0.529 h VUnbroken/Vstart ...
Table A.1: Data gathered by running ElimLin on 7 rounds of Simon 64/128
NR K Vstart Vunbroken r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7
7 2 448 248 1472 128 64 8 0
7 3 608 268 2208 192 128 20 0
7 4 768 271 2944 256 192 49 0
7 5 928 262 3680 320 256 89 1 0
7 6 1088 244 4416 384 320 139 1 0
7 7 1248 215 5152 448 384 200 1 0
7 8 1408 188 5888 512 448 259 1 0
7 9 1568 158 6624 576 512 320 2 0
7 10 1728 126 7360 640 576 384 2 0
7 11 1888 82 8096 704 640 448 14 0
7 12 2048 0 8832 768 704 512 17 47 0
Table A.2: Data gathered by running ElimLin on 8 rounds of Simon 64/128
NR K Vstart Vunbroken r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7
8 2 512 317 1600 128 64 3 0
8 4 896 409 3200 256 192 39 0
8 8 1664 443 6400 512 448 261 0
8 10 2048 448 8000 640 576 384 0
8 12 2432 448 9600 768 704 512 0
8 16 3200 444 12800 1024 960 768 4 0
8 20 3968 439 16000 1280 1216 1024 9 0
8 25 4928 435 20000 1600 1536 1344 13 0
8 30 5888 525 24000 1920 1856 1664 23 0
8 32 6272 417 25600 2048 1984 1792 31 0
8 40 7808 402 32000 2560 2496 2304 46 0
8 50 7808 378 40000 3200 3136 2944 70 0
8 64 12416 307 51200 4096 4032 3840 140 1 0
8 70 13568 249 56000 4480 4416 4224 189 10 0
Appendix B
Java Tool for Deep Inspection of
ElimLin
Guangyan Song and Nicolas Courtois: “Java tool for DEEP INSPECTION of
equations generated with ElimLin over GF(2) in Cryptalanalysis of Block Ci-
phers”, available at http://www.nicolascourtois.com/software/
DeepElimlin-1.4-SNAPSHOT.jar. Documentation can be found in the ap-
propriate section of this web page: http://www.cryptosystem.net/aes/
tools.html.
Appendix C
Examples of Cracked Brainwallet
Passwords
We have found over 18,000 cracked Brainwallet passwords. In 2016, our open
source tool was given to students for a UCL code breaking competition in module
GA18. More than 100 new passwords were found by MSc students: Iason Papa-
panagiotakis, Jeonghyuk Park, Ellery Smith, Weixiu Tan and Wei Shao. Here we
only list some interesting passwords. The full result remains confidential for secu-
rity reasons.
1. say hello to my little friend
2. to be or not to be
3. Walk Into This Room
4. party like it’s 1999
5. yohohoandabottleofrum
6. dudewheresmycar
7. dajiahao
8. hankou
9. {1summer2leo3phoebe
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10. 0racle9i
11. andreas antonopoulos
12. Arnold Schwarzenegger
13. blablablablablablabla
14. for the longest time
15. captain spaulding
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